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Abstract 
This dissertation is motivated by the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the failure of the 
mainstream economic methodology to detect the increased fragility of the pre-crisis 
financial system. I explore the viability of alternative approaches focusing on the 
methodological blind spots that were revealed by the financial crisis. In particular, I focus on 
ecological approaches since economics and ecology share many phenomenological 
similarities but harbor many opposing methodological doctrines, which make them 
complementary. The collection of projects presented here is my attempt at facilitating 
crosspollination between the two disciplines dealing with similar problems. The first project 
considers the connections between ecology and economics, and provides a historical 
account of how analogical models inspired by different research paradigms led to the 
development of two contrasting methodological perspectives in economics, the classical 
physics worldview and the life sciences worldview. I find that the recent financial crisis 
precipitated a shift in economic methodology towards approaches inspired by life sciences. 
In the remaining two projects I apply ecological models to finance by combining network 
approaches with agent-based simulations to study contagion in banking systems. In the first 
simulation study I explore the impact of uncertainty on the stability of banking networks 
and show that information asymmetries lead to a striking increase in the risk of system 
collapse after a financial shock. In the second simulation study I investigate the relationship 
between concentration and resilience in banking systems.  I find, counterintuitively, that an 
increase in concentration can be beneficial for system stability in certain conditions. 
Specifically, when concentration is decoupled from inequality, its increase can improve 
system resilience. Taken together, this thesis shows that ecological approaches can be 
fruitfully used to illuminate economic problems. 
Keywords: financial crisis, paradigm shift, physics, life sciences, ecology, network, simulation, 
        resilience 
Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation ist motiviert durch die Finanzkrise im Jahre 2007-2009 und das Versagen 
der ökonomischen Methodologie die gestiegene Fragilität des Finanzsystems vor der Krise 
zu erkennen. Ich untersuche die Nützlichkeit von alternativen Ansätzen und fokussiere dabei 
auf methodologischen Defizite des Standardansatzes, die sich im Zuge der Finanzkrise 
offenbart haben. Insbesondere fokussiere ich auf ökologische Ansätze, da die Ökonomie 
und die Ökologie ähnliche phänomenologische Gemeinsamkeiten haben und dennoch viele 
gegensätzliche methodologische Doktrinen beherbergen, so dass sie sich ergänzen können. 
Die Ansammlung von Studien, die ich hier präsentiere, ist mein Versuch die 
Kreuzbestäubung der zwei Disziplinen, die sich mit ähnlichen Problemen auseinander 
setzen, zu erleichtern. Die erste Studie betrachtet die Verbindungen zwischen Ökologie und 
Ökonomie und setzt sich mit der historischen Fragestellung auseinander wie Analogie-
Modelle, inspiriert durch unterschiedliche Forschungsparadigmen, zu einer Entwicklung von 
zwei gegensätzlichen methodologischen Sichtweisen innerhalb der Ökonomie geführt 
haben: die Weltsicht der klassischen Physik und die Weltsicht der Lebenswissenschaften. 
Dabei finde ich, dass die Finanzkrise eine Veränderung in der ökonomischen Methodologie 
in Richtung von Ansätzen aus den Lebenswissenschaften verursacht hat. In den letzten zwei 
Studien wende ich ökologische Modelle auf die Finanzwissenschaft an, indem ich Netzwerk-
Ansätze mit Agenten-basierten Simulationen kombiniere, um Contangion-Effekte in 
Bankensystemen zu studieren. In der ersten Simulationsstudie untersuche ich den Einfluss 
von Unsicherheit auf die Stabilität von Bankensystemen und finde, dass 
Informationsasymmetrien zu einem erstaunlichen Anstieg des Risikos eines Systemkollapses 
nach einem Finanzschock führen können. In der zweiten Simulationsstudie untersuche ich 
den Zusammenhang zwischen Konzentration und Resilienz von Bankensystemen. Ich finde, 
kontraintuitiv, dass ein Anstieg in Konzentration unter bestimmten Umständen für die 
Systemstabilität nützlich sein kann. Im Besonderen, wenn Konzentration von Ungleichheit 
entkoppelt ist, kann ihr Anstieg die Systemresilienz erhöhen. Zusammengefasst, zeige ich in 
dieser Arbeit, dass ökologische Ansätze fruchtbar gemacht werden können, um 
ökonomische Probleme zu beleuchten. 
Schlüsselwörter: Finanzkrise, Paradigmenwechsel, Physik, Lebenswissenschaften, Ökologie, 
                               Netzwerk, Simulation, Resilienz
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1. Introduction
The 2007-2009 financial crisis and the failure of economists to detect the increased 
fragility of the pre-crisis financial system, let alone anticipate the breakdown, sparked an 
intense public discussion among economists, scholars from other fields, and policy makers 
about the credibility of methodology used in mainstream economics (e.g. Cochrane, 2011; 
Haldane & Madouros, 2012; Krugman, 2009). According to critics, economic models are: too 
abstract and hard to relate to economic reality; reductionist and lacking the holistic 
perspective needed to integrate pieces of economic reality in a coherent whole; based on 
assumptions with no empirical support such as rationality, selfishness, or equilibrium. In this 
context, a variety of research programs practicing alternative approaches have claimed that 
their methods can provide a viable remedy. The question that naturally arises is: which of 
the offered alternatives is capable of dealing with the identified blind spots in mainstream 
methodology?  
This work explores the possibility of applying methods from ecology, a discipline that 
shares many phenomenological similarities with economics, to the study of economic 
systems. Both ecology and economics are concerned with the interplay of many 
heterogeneous agents interacting in a non-random manner, often producing nonlinear 
effects, amplifications, and feedback loops. This is why, for instance, a synchronized 
behavior such as hoarding can be observed in both domains and is a common factor 
underlying collective dynamics in biological populations and financial markets. One can also 
find meaningful parallels between the two at the micro level: both humans and animals 
compete for market share or territory, form coalitions to survive or outperform other 
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groups, as well as make their living in their respective complex environments composed 
again of many interacting factors, from climate to market regulations. 
At their very beginnings, economics and ecology were commonly recognized as 
disciplines devoted to studying the allocation of scarce resources. The reference of “ecology 
as the economy of nature” dates back to Carl Linnaeus in 1749 (Egerton, 2007), and also 
appears later in the first comprehensive definition of ecology proposed in 1870 by Ernst 
Heinrich Haeckel: 
“By ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature – 
the investigation of the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic and to its 
organic; including above all, its friendly and inimical relations with those animals and 
plants with which it comes directly or indirectly into contact – in a word, ecology is 
the study of all those complex interrelationships referred to by Darwin as the 
conditions of the struggle for existence.” (cited in Costanza, 1996, p. 978)  
The two disciplines can also be defined in a complementary way: economics deals with the 
ecology of humans, with a focus on how they manage their affairs; whereas ecology covers 
the economy of the rest of nature that does not ordinarily include humans (Costanza, 1996). 
Furthermore, ecology and economics are both keenly interested in understanding the 
dynamics and stability of their respective systems. Yet, ecology and economics developed 
very different methodologies. 
An early advocate of biologically oriented approaches in economics, Alfred Marshal, 
was explicit about the methodological difficulties he faced in building up an alliance 
between these two disciplines that are naturally connected:  
“The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic 
dynamics. But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics; a 
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volume on Foundations must therefore give a relatively large place to mechanical 
analogies; and frequent use is made of the term ‘equilibrium,’ which suggests 
something of statical analogy.” (Marshal, 1890/1920, p. 19) 
A more general insight about methodological challenges arising from complexity comes 
from Warren Weaver (1948) who provided a systematic decomposition of scientific 
questions by distinguishing between problems of simplicity, disorganized complexity, and 
organized complexity. He provided examples to illustrate that methods that proved 
successful in dealing with problems of simplicity were ineffective with problems of 
disorganized and organized complexity. While the introduction of statistical approaches 
made a significant advance in dealing with problems of disorganized complexity, problems 
of organized complexity in which variables interact in a nonrandom manner still remained 
difficult to deal with. He explained that it was physics that initially started dealing with 
simple problems, while biology was naturally devoted to problems of organized complexity, 
given that problems of living organisms “are seldom those in which one can rigidly maintain 
constant all but two variables” (Weaver, 1948, p. 2). 
 The major scientific revolution, which introduced the Age of Enlightenment, was 
ushered in by a research paradigm that was successful in explaining “simple” physical 
phenomena such as the interaction of two moving bodies, the trajectory of falling objects, 
or celestial motions. The advent of mechanical physics had a huge impact in science and 
methods that proved efficient in the physical domain soon became exemplars for research 
in other fields. These events found economics and ecology standing on different intellectual 
traditions. While the study of economic issues was deeply rooted in moral philosophy 
mostly concerned with theory (e.g. Adam Smith, 1723–1790), ecological phenomena were 
investigated by scholars within the biological tradition devoted to empirical research (e.g. 
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Carl Linnaeus, 1707–1778). Therefore, the success of Newtonian physics had different 
impacts on the two nascent disciplines: the study of economic problems was taken over by 
engineers and physicists such as Leon Walras (1834–1910), Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), 
William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), and Alfred Marshal (1842–1924), who set the 
methodological foundations of the field; whereas ecology remained in hands of zoologist, 
botanists, physicians, geographers, and explorers such as Alexander von Humboldt (1769–
1859), Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), Karl Möbius (1825–1908), and Eugenius Warming 
(1841–1924). The former used philosophical theorizing to link physical and economic 
phenomena, whereas the latter stuck to observation and made most of their contribution 
not in theory but rather in the collection, classification, and description of ecological 
phenomena. 
 In the given context, the difference in the intellectual cultures of economics and 
ecology produced a vast discrepancy in established worldviews and methodologies that 
shaped the two fields. The “simplified” worldview borrowed from Newtonian physics led to 
the development of foundational assumptions in economics such as rationality, selfishness, 
equilibrium, and the independence of economic interactions (Colander, Holt, & Rosser, 
2004; Weintraub, 2007). For instance, it took more than a century and the establishment of 
a separate branch in the field, behavioral economics, to place importance on observations 
and show that the assumptions of rationality and selfishness cannot be empirically 
supported. On the other hand, ecology was strongly influenced by Charles Darwin and thus 
interested in the evolution of biological populations, as well as out-of-equilibrium dynamics. 
Ecologists were also deeply interested in interspecies interactions and constructed food 
webs, integrating them in a holistic way with other environmental factors. 
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 Weaver’s (1948) decomposition of scientific problems helped with the 
understanding of the important reasons for the divergence of the doctrinal positions and 
methodology of the two fields. However, it begets the question: Which of Weaver’s 
categories do most of economic and ecological phenomena belong? Reminiscent of 
Weaver’s argument that different kinds of complexity require different treatments, a classic 
paper by Philip Warren Anderson (1972) argued that each successive level of complexity 
often necessitates the invention of novel methodological approaches. Anderson gave the 
example of how the fundamental laws postulated by reductionistic physics, such as particle 
physics, have a very limited application in the domain of solid-state physics, which deals 
with many elementary entities well understood in particle physics. He made the general 
argument that “At each stage [of complexity] entirely new laws, concepts, and 
generalizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as 
in the previous one. Psychology is not applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry” (P. 
W. Anderson, 1972, p. 393). Another example he gave was that quantum physics and 
relativity theory provide laws for different aspects of physical reality, which can be 
successfully applied in their respective domains despite our difficulties to reconcile them.  
 Returning to the question posed earlier: where do economic and ecological 
phenomena belong in Weaver’s taxonomy of complexity? According to Anderson (1972), 
who constructed a hypothetical hierarchy of sciences, social sciences reside at the highest 
level of complexity. While economics is clearly a social science, there are many indications 
that ecological phenomena also belong to very high levels of the hierarchy of complexity. 
Ecologists are concerned about problems that include organisms, their social interactions, as 
well as their adaptation to the non-living habitat, such as landscape, soil type, or climate. 
For instance, understanding the stability of relatively simple costal, estuarine, or savanna 
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ecosystems requires a comprehensive analysis of the number of often intricately 
interconnected factors (Costanza, Kemp, & Boynton, 1993; Van Langevelde et al., 2003). 
Similarly, economics studies the variety of human economic interactions taking into account 
different aspects of the context in which they take place. Furthermore, economics is 
interested in the ecological aspects of human activity, and conversely modern ecology also 
incorporates humans in the study of socio-ecological systems (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Holling, 
2001), which can make existing ecological problems even more complex (Liu et al., 2007). 
Therefore, a substantial portion of phenomena from both fields consists of a number of 
factors acting together simultaneously to shape the resulting patterns observed in those 
phenomena.  
 Even though the described phenomenological similarities would suggest 
corresponding methodological similarities, many approaches that have been successfully 
applied in ecology are still not common in mainstream economics. Agent-based models in 
combination with network approaches, for instance, are common tools that provide a 
framework for studying the structure of interactions between species in an ecosystem 
(Grimm et al., 2006; Janssen, Schoon, Ke, & Börner, 2006), but are still scarcely used in 
mainstream economics. Nevertheless, there are some good examples of the use of these 
models in finance, even though they are often applied by researchers from other disciplines 
(e.g. physicists, or epidemiologists) and have yet to gain acceptance from the mainstream. 
The collaboration among the adherents of the ecological view in economics eventually led 
to the establishment of the International Society of Ecological Economics, and the journal 
Ecological Economics published its first issue in 1988 (Costanza, 1996). Perhaps the most 
influential research program that advocates approaches in line with those from modern 
ecology is that of complex systems, commonly associated with the Santa Fe Institute for 
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Complex Systems founded in 1984. While ecosystems are typical examples of complex 
systems, the paradigm of complex systems is more abstract and covers a variety of physical 
and biological phenomena that share characteristics such as nonlinear interactions, self-
organization, emergence, feedback loops, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and hierarchical 
organization. Within this paradigm, a special kind of complex systems, complex adaptive 
systems, are recognized as distinctly relevant for a better understanding of the resilience of 
ecological and economic systems. Complex adaptive systems are distinguished by their 
particular ability to memorize, learn, and adapt to various environmental changes (Holland, 
1992b), features also observed in ecological and economic phenomena (Di Matteo, Aste, & 
Dacorogna, 2005; Lo, 1991). 
As a result of these dispersed efforts, after the 2007–2009 financial crisis ecological 
insights have been more commonly used to understand the resilience of financial markets 
(Battiston et al., 2016; May, Levin, & Sugihara, 2008). Some examples of concepts from 
ecology and complex systems that are becoming increasingly frequent in the finance 
literature are tipping points (Scheffer et al., 2012), warning signs (Scheffer et al., 2009), 
relationships between the structural properties of system and its resilience (e.g. too central 
to fail concept, Thurner & Poledna, 2013), and the use of agent-based simulations as tools 
for designing financial regulations (Klimek, Poledna, Farmer, & Thurner, 2015; Poledna & 
Thurner, 2014).  
 The collection of projects presented in this dissertation is my attempt at facilitating 
crosspollination between the two disciplines dealing with similar problems. The dissertation 
contains three chapters: the first chapter considers the conceptual connections between 
ecology and economics, but also the application of other influential analogical models in 
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economics; the second and third chapters are applications of ecological models in studying 
financial markets.  
The first chapter provides a historical account of how different analogical models, 
such as those from mechanistic physics, evolutionary biology and ecology, inspired the 
modeling of economic phenomena. Following Gerald Holton’s (1988) thematic analysis I 
identify methodological themata that characterize each of those analogical models. I further 
argue that analogies have led to the development of two contrasting methodological 
perspectives in economics, the classical physics worldview and the life sciences worldview, 
and show that they are characterized by distinctive and often incompatible thematic 
positions. For instance, analogies from classical mechanics can be associated with thematic 
positions such as reductionism, equilibrium, and certainty. In contrast, analogies from life 
sciences based on concepts of evolution, ecology, and complex adaptive systems suggest 
opposite thematic positions such as holism, discontinuities, and uncertainty. While 
analogies from physics were dominant in the mainstream approach throughout the era of 
classical and neoclassical economics and analogies from the life sciences had minor 
influence, there is little evidence about the current state of the field. With this in mind, I 
speculate that the 2007–2009 financial crisis provided an intellectual stimulus to economists 
to reconsider their methodology given the amount of public criticism that arouse in the 
aftermath of the crisis. I use survey and keyword analysis to compare methodological 
themata employed in papers produced at five leading economics departments before and 
after the crisis. I find some early indications of paradigm change and openness of economic 
methodology toward more organic analogies: a higher involvement of holistic at the 
expense of reductionist approaches, increased use of complex adaptive systems as a 
suitable framework for policy-making recommendations, wider adoption of bounded 
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rationality as a model of economic agents, as well as higher occurrence of keywords such as 
complexity, novelty, discontinuity, and networks in the papers written after the crisis. 
 In the second chapter, I study the role of information and confidence in the spread of 
financial shocks through interbank markets. Confidence in financial institutions has only 
recently been introduced in computational models studying the resilience of financial 
networks (Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, & May, 2012). However, so far it has been assumed that 
all agents have complete information about the system. In this study I add realism to a 
model of interbank markets by introducing uncertainty into what banks know about other 
banks. In my model, information spreads through the lending network and the quality of 
information depends on the proximity of the information source. Instead of having 
complete information, banks receive information that is delayed, noisy, or local. This affects 
their confidence and the resulting lending decisions. I show that introducing uncertainty 
leads to a substantial increase in systemic risk after an idiosyncratic bank failure. In contrast, 
when the same shock is distributed among multiple smaller banks, uncertainty mitigates the 
impact of the shock. The consequences of a large bank’s failure are the most difficult to 
predict. This chapter demonstrates the need for a better understanding of the role of 
information asymmetries in systemic risk in financial networks. 
 The last chapter investigates the role of concentration in the resilience of banking 
systems. Since the 2007–2009 financial crisis, mounting evidence suggests that failures of 
large banks represent a major risk for the resilience of banking networks. This finding is 
widely used to link the increasing concentration of financial markets with an increase in 
their fragility. However, the same argument can easily result in the mistaken idea that any 
market change associated with an increase in concentration also amplifies systemic risk. In 
this study I apply stress tests to both hypothetical and empirically calibrated banking 
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networks to observe how various bank-size distributions affect systemic risk. I find that, 
analogous to the resilience of ecosystems, no single property of banking networks could 
explain the probability of systemic failure. I quantify concentration in terms of the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index and also identify an additional indicator, inequality, measured 
by Rao’s quadratic entropy, which is important for understanding the concentration–
resilience relationship. I find, counterintuitively, that an increase in concentration is 
beneficial when it is not followed by an increase in inequality. Similarly, a decrease in 
concentration becomes harmful when it is not followed by a decrease in inequality. Mergers 
of large banks increased, whereas mergers of small banks decreased systemic risk. Splitting 
of large banks was also effective in reducing systemic risk if splitting was not overdone to 
the extent that it resulted in too many small banks. These results provide a guideline that 
can be applied to frequent issues that regulators face, such as bank mergers. 
Taken together, the work in this thesis shows that ecological approaches can illuminate 
important economic phenomena, including the effects of uncertainty, concentration, and 
inequality on the resilience of banking systems. More broadly, the thesis shows that there 
are systematic methods that can help in selecting analogical models well suited to the 
problems of interest. Unlike Marshal who could not afford to follow his own intuition, 
present-day researchers have the opportunity to take advantage of various methodological 
advances that put them in a better position to deal with complex problems. For instance, 
the development of conceptual foundations such as complex systems, analytical techniques 
such as network approaches and agent-based simulations, as well as various technological 
innovations such as widely accessible and increasingly powerful computational devices 
provides a strong foundation for the future research that does not need to compromise its 
way. 
 
 
14 
2. The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis and Paradigm Shift: A Study on Analogies in 
the History of Economics* 
 
Abstract. The recent 2007–2009 financial crisis has sparked discussion on whether failure of 
economists to detect the increased fragility of the pre-crisis financial system can be 
attributed to their supposedly outdated models that still have a strong neoclassical spirit 
(Arthur, 2014; Cochrane, 2011; Colander, 2010; Colander et al., 2009; Farmer & 
Geanakoplos, 2009; Haldane & Madouros, 2012; Krugman, 2009). Inspired by this 
discussion, we sought to answer two questions: (i) To what extent does contemporary 
mainstream economic methodology still hinge on classical physics? (ii) Has the experience of 
the financial crisis encouraged the use of alternative analogies in mainstream economic 
methodology? To answer these questions, we conducted a systematic analysis of analogies 
used throughout the history of economics. In line with Gerald Holoton’s thematic analysis 
(1988), we argue that analogies have led to the development of two contrasting 
methodological perspectives in economics, the classical physics worldview and the life 
sciences worldview, and show that they are characterized by distinctive and often 
incompatible thematic positions. For instance, analogies from classical mechanics can be 
associated with thematic positions such as reductionism, equilibrium, and certainty. In 
contrast, analogies from life sciences based on concepts of evolution, ecology, and complex 
adaptive systems suggest opposite thematic positions such as holism, discontinuities, and 
uncertainty. While analogies from physics were dominant in the mainstream approach 
throughout the era of classical and neoclassical economics and analogies from the life 
sciences had minor influence, there is little evidence about the current state of the field. To 
assess the current situation and test if the 2007–2009 financial crisis provided an intellectual 
stimulus to economists to reconsider their methodology, we used survey and keyword 
analysis to compare methodological themata employed in papers produced at five leading 
economics departments before and after the crisis. We found some early indications of 
paradigm change and openness of economic methodology toward more organic analogies: a 
higher involvement of holistic at the expense of reductionist approaches, increased use of 
complex adaptive systems as a suitable framework for policy-making recommendations, 
wider adoption of bounded rationality as a model of economic agents, as well as higher 
occurrence of keywords such as complexity, novelty, discontinuity, and networks in the 
papers written after the crisis. 
                                                     
 
∗ I collaborated on a version of this chapter together with Mirta Galesic and Gerd Gigerenzer. 
 
 
15 
Introduction 
The founding father of economics, Adam Smith, explicitly expressed his deep admiration for 
Isaac Newton’s work:  
“The superior genius and sagacity of Sir Isaac Newton…made…the greatest and most 
admirable improvement that was ever made in philosophy, when he discovered, that 
he could join together the movements of the Planets by so familiar a principle of 
connection, which completely removed all the difficulties the imagination had 
hitherto felt in attending to them.” (Smith, 1795/1822, p. 71) 
Newton’s methods affected Smith’s standpoint on not only the order of the material world, 
but also human nature (Alvey, 1999). The mechanistic spirit of Smith’s The Wealth of 
Nations reveals a strong influence of Newton’s Principia (Lowe, 1975; Sebba, 1953). The 
influence extended to Leon Walras: “The necessary and sufficient reason for the equilibrium 
of the economic world, just as the universal attraction based directly on the mass and 
inversely upon the square of the distance is the reason for the equilibrium of the 
astronomical world” (Walras, 1927/1987, p. 320). Newtonian physics became the analogy 
for classical and later neoclassical economics. 
Just as in science in general (Holton, 1988), analogical reasoning is important in 
economics and finance. Real-world economic systems are extremely complex, difficult to 
measure, and difficult to predict. As Knight (1921) pointed out, much of economic 
interaction is characterized by deep uncertainty that is hard or impossible to quantify but 
necessary to make a profit. In Binmore’s (2009) terms, an economic system is a “large 
world,” characterized by limited information and rapid change in the environment. Models 
of risk developed for “small worlds,” where probabilities and outcomes are known, are not 
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necessarily successful in large worlds. Because of its complexity, the study of economics has 
relied on analogies from more familiar domains since the beginning. For instance, William 
Stanley Jevons (1871/1888) used a mechanical lever as a model for his theory of exchange. 
Similarly, a pendulum was the vehicle of Paul Samuelson’s (1986, pp. 231–232) optimization 
model, and Irving Fisher (1892) developed a general equilibrium model of a three-consumer 
economy as a hydraulic machine, which was actually constructed (Brainard & Scarf, 2005). 
Random walk, a fundamental assumption of modern finance, was inspired by Fourier’s 
model of thermal conduction within a material body (Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2010).  
There is ample evidence that theories suggested by Smith’s successors, such as 
Jevons, Walras, and Vilfredo Pareto, were strongly inspired by classical mechanics (Ingrao & 
Israel, 2000; Mirowski, 1989). Marginalism and general equilibrium theory, two classic 
examples, immediately became the main pillars of economic theory. It is generally accepted 
that the use of analogies from classical mechanics and thermodynamics had great 
consequences for the development of the field of economics. Yet, some authors have 
argued that the seeds of classical physics1 are planted so deeply in the economic 
methodology that their influence on economic thinking and modeling is still significant 
within the so-called mainstream approach. This has become increasingly relevant since the 
recent 2007–2009 financial crisis that has sparked discussion on whether the failure of 
economists to detect the increased fragility of the pre-crisis financial system can be 
attributed to their supposedly outdated models that still have a strong neoclassical spirit 
(Arthur, 2014; Cochrane, 2011; Colander, 2010; Colander et al., 2009; Farmer & 
                                                     
 
1 Here we adopt a narrower definition of classical physics that includes classical mechanics, classical electrodynamics, and 
classical thermodynamics but not special and general relativity, classical chaos theory, and nonlinear dynamics. In 
particular, our classical physics model includes economic interpretations of models of classical mechanics and 
thermodynamics. 
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Geanakoplos, 2009; Haldane & Madouros, 2012; Krugman, 2009). Inspired by this 
discussion, we set out to answer two questions: (i) To what extent does contemporary 
mainstream economic methodology still hinge on classical physics? (ii) Has the experience of 
the financial crisis encouraged the use of alternative analogies in the mainstream economic 
methodology? 
To answer these questions, we conducted an analysis of analogies used throughout 
the history of economics. Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) perspective on the cycle of 
scientific revolutions, we argue that analogies, as tools for coping with uncertainty and 
conceptualizing the unknown, will be discussed particularly often in the parts of Kuhn’s cycle 
in which there is no established view of the world (prescience) or when there is low 
confidence in an established worldview (crisis of the model). Prescience is characterized by 
inventive mapping of analogies to the phenomena of interest and using them to develop 
initial methodological tools. In this period, analogies are easy to notice in the literature. In 
particular, early economists, such as Walras, Jevons, Pareto, and Alfred Marshal, did not 
hesitate to explicitly discuss analogies for their models and even included them in their 
textbooks.  When a particular worldview and the corresponding methodological tools 
become widely accepted by the scientific community, the cycle reaches the period of 
normal science. In this period, the analogies that led to the development of the tools 
become invisible. Crisis of the model typically arrives with major scientific revolutions or 
events momentous for a particular field that raise wider awareness of the limitations of the 
established worldview and its underlying analogies; the analogies are revisited and 
alternatives are discussed. This analogical cycle of scientific revolutions suggests that our 
second question, whether the latest financial crisis brought changes to the economic 
methodology, could be answered affirmatively. Specifically, we explored whether the 
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greatest financial breakdown since the Great Depression has set off a crisis of the standard 
classical physics model, which should be indicated by the increased discussion of analogies. 
Since the discussion of thematic inspirations is absent from the “public science” (Holton, 
1996), and there are no definite signs of an overt crisis, we looked for covert indications of 
change at the methodological level. We reasoned that if such indications were found, 
postcrisis economic methodology might have become more open to alternative analogies, 
which should be reflected in decreased use of analogies from classical physics and increased 
use of competing alternatives, primarily life sciences analogies. This, in turn, creates a 
context in which a paradigm change might occur. 
To assess a possible change of analogical content in the economic methodology, we 
adopted Gerald Holton’s (1973/1988) thematic analysis. More than 40 years ago Holton 
introduced thematic analysis as a tool for exploring the thematic origins of scientific 
discoveries. A success or failure of scientific agendas, Holton argued, can be associated with 
thematic presuppositions—themata that guide scientific thinking. Themata are “highly 
motivating and general presuppositions or hypotheses that are not directly derivable from 
the phenomena and are not provable or falsifiable” (Holton, 1996, pp. 454–455). In this 
context, we classified the most influential analogical thematic concepts in economic thought 
according to the two principal worldviews: the classical physics worldview and the life 
sciences worldview. The worldviews are composed of various analogies, and other analogies 
that cannot be included in either of the two categories are discussed, as well (see Table 1). 
Not all themata are equally relevant for each analogical model, hence some of the cells in 
Table 1 are not defined (ND). Since our focus is on assessment of economic methodology, 
we paid special attention to methodological themata that are derived from respective 
thematic concepts. Methodological themata are basic methodological presuppositions that 
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serve as guiding ideas in designing a particular scientific inquiry. For instance, reductionism 
is a methodological presupposition that properties of a complex phenomenon can be 
deduced from the interaction of an arbitrarily small number of its fundamental parts. 
Methodological themata can often been represented as opposing dyads, such as 
reductionism/holism or certainty/uncertainty. In line with Holton’s approach, we composed 
a thematic map based on these dual representations, that is, a set of methodological 
themata that can be used to characterize and contrast relevant thematic concepts. Take 
reductionism/holism and certainty/uncertainty as an example of a simple thematic map: 
Analogies from classical mechanics would be associated with the left end of the dyads 
(reductionism and certainty) and analogies from ecology would correspond to the opposite 
end (holism and uncertainty), as shown in Figure 1. In this framework our questions can be 
reformulated: (i) How far apart are thematic positions of contemporary mainstream 
economics and classical physics on our thematic map? (ii) Has the position of mainstream 
economics changed in the expected direction because of the financial crisis?  
 
 
Figure 1. An example of a thematic map. 
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Table 1. Overview of the analogies and the corresponding methodological themata 
Methodological 
thema 
Analogical model 
Classical physics worldview Unclassified Life sciences worldview 
Mechanistic Thermodynamic Chaotic Statistical Evolutionary Ecological Complexity  
1. Reduction Strong 
reductionism 
Strong 
reductionism 
Holism Holism Holism Holism Holism 
2. Isolation Closed system Closed system ND Closed or open 
system 
ND Open system Open system 
3. Reversibility Reversible Irreversible ND Irreversible Irreversible Irreversible Irreversible 
4. Dynamic 
tendency  
Equilibrium Equilibrium Discontinuities 
Equilibrium or 
discontinuities 
Discontinuities Discontinuities Discontinuities 
5. Linearity Linear Linear Nonlinear ND Nonlinear Nonlinear Nonlinear 
6. Determinism Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic Stochastic 
7. Complexity  Simple Simple Complex Simple or 
complex 
Complex Complex Complex 
8. Epistemological 
view 
Certainty Certainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty Uncertainty 
9. Behavioral 
model 
Rational actor Rational actor ND ND 
Bounded 
rationality 
Bounded 
rationality 
Bounded 
rationality 
10. Stability 
concept 
Engineering 
resilience  
Engineering 
resilience  
ND ND ND 
Ecological 
resilience 
Ecological 
resilience 
Note. ND = Not defined.
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Given that relatively little time has passed since the crisis and that the publication 
lead time of economic journals is quite long (Ellison, 2002), our study focused on working 
papers produced at five leading economics departments before and after the crisis. In 
particular, we contrasted papers that became publically available immediately before the 
crisis in 2006 with corresponding papers from 2013. To place the methodology of the papers 
on our thematic map, we employed two methods: a questionnaire study and a keyword 
study. In the questionnaire study we asked authors of the papers to assess to what extent 
certain methodological assumptions were reflected in their studies. In the keyword study, 
for the same corpus of papers, we counted occurrences of keywords that corresponded to 
different methodological themata. Our results suggest that on an absolute level, 
methodological presuppositions inherited from classical physics are still deeply entrenched 
in mainstream economics. On the other hand, signs of change in the methodology due to 
the crisis are moderate but present. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We start with a section addressing 
conceptual aspects of analogies, followed by a section presenting a historical overview of 
influential analogies for economics models (Table 1). The same section also deals with 
corresponding methodological themata and the construction of the thematic map. The last 
section provides details on the questionnaire and keyword studies, including the results. We 
end with a discussion of results. 
Analogies 
The terms analogy and metaphor are often used interchangeably (McCloskey, 1985; 
Mirowski, 1989). While both are used to make comparisons, analogies are usually 
characterized as more elaborate than metaphors. For instance, metaphors typically 
compare general features of objects from different domains (e.g., “the atom is a solar 
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system”), and analogies compare relationships between objects in one domain to 
corresponding relationships in another domain (e.g., “electrons circulating in the nucleus 
are like planets orbiting the sun”; Klamer & Leonard, 1994). According to the structure-
mapping theory,2 an analogy is “a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the base) into 
another (the target), which conveys that a system of relations that holds among the base 
objects also holds among the target objects” (Gentner, 1998). 
Cognitive tools for uncertainty 
Using analogies to understand and explain the unknown is prevalent in science. Their 
potential to generate creative ideas and fresh insights, particularly important for scientific 
discovery, is widely recognized by philosophers of science (Hesse, 1966; Kuhn, 1979; 
McCloskey, 1985), psychologists (Gentner et al., 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1996; Langley & 
Jones, 1988), and economists (Morgan, 2012). When faced with phenomena that are novel, 
difficult to observe, or very complex, scientists often use analogies from familiar domains 
(Dunbar, 1997). Maxwell was explicit: “Instead of using the analogy of heat, a fluid, the 
properties of which are entirely at our disposal, is assumed as the vehicle of mathematical 
reasoning.... The mathematical ideas obtained from the fluid are then applied to various 
parts of electrical science” (Maxwell, 1855/1990, p. 367). Similarly, Smith was also deeply 
aware of their importance: “The analogy, which…gives occasion to a few ingenious 
similitudes became the great hinge upon which every thing turned” (Smith, 1795/1822, p. 
18). 
More generally, people use analogies to interpret unfamiliar situations in everyday 
life. Analogical thinking is a cognitive tool specialized to deal with novelty and uncertainty 
                                                     
 
2
 Structure mapping is a theory of human processing of analogy and similarity (Gentner, 1983). 
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(Chan, Paletz, & Schunn, 2012). In the psychological literature this is recognized on many 
different levels. One of the most serious challenges in learning and problem-solving 
research is understanding how people act in novel environments. Thus, many general 
theoretical problem-solving frameworks integrate analogy as a strategy selection 
instrument in uncertain conditions. The heuristic-based information-processing models of 
Simon and Newell (1971) recognize analogy as an important strategy for searching in a 
problem space.3 Similarly, analogical mapping has been incorporated in Anderson’s ACT-R 
cognitive architecture as a potential mechanism for constructing new production rules4 (J. R. 
Anderson, Fincham, & Douglass, 1997; Salvucci & Anderson, 2001).  
The power and limitations of analogies 
Analogies can be used to explain a new concept (pedagogical analogies), cast new 
light on a subject (heuristic analogies), or even import a novel way of thinking on a more 
fundamental level (constitutive analogies; Klamer & Leonard, 1994). Here we focus on 
constitutive analogies, which are often used to interpret an unknown domain (target) by 
borrowing a well-established model or a system of relationships from a more familiar 
scientific domain (source or base). An example is the use of evolutionary models to explain 
the emergence of new technologies, firms, and industries, as well as their development, 
progress, and extinction. For instance, the concept of natural selection among species is 
applied to modeling competition among firms. “In doing so, economists can be said to have 
‘chosen’ the world of the model” (Morgan, 2012, p. 173). 
                                                     
 
3
 Even some of the general problem-solving architectures fully rely on a broadly interpreted form of analogical reasoning 
(R. M. Jones & Langley, 2005). 
4
 In computer science, production systems are forms of artificial intelligence (i.e., programs) consisting of a set of 
production rules that specify the behavior of the system. To create a new production rule is to create a new behavior 
necessary for dealing with a novel situation.  
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The power of models and methodologies, especially those borrowed from other 
fields, to shape scientific reality has been documented in many areas of science (Gigerenzer, 
1991). Understanding the analogical process that led to the use of a model can help people 
recognize the worldview, assumptions, and methodologies that are transferred along with 
the model. Since analogies are used in uncertain situations when phenomena of interest are 
alien or obscure, the difference between models and reality may not be obvious. In 
addition, analogies are based on only partial similarities between domains, and applying 
analogical models focuses attention on some features of a complex reality while ignoring 
others. Confusing a model with reality increases the likelihood not only of imputing ill-fitting 
features of the model source to reality, but also of omitting important aspects of reality not 
captured by the analogical model. Recognizing the source of models used to represent 
target phenomena reminds people that they are dealing with models and not reality. 
Analogies as themata 
 In our framework, analogies correspond to thematic concepts. Thematic concepts in 
turn provide grounds for methodological themata, which we simply call themata. For 
instance, reduction is a thema that emerged from classical mechanics. Themata are then 
defined in terms of conflicting thematic positions, such as reductionism and holism in the 
case of reduction. This simple duality can be more nuanced, and in the case of reduction we 
make a distinction between strong reductionism, weak reductionism, and holism. For 
simplicity our thematic map (Figure 2) merges weak reductionism and holism because they 
have methodological similarities, but we keep the distinction in the questionnaire study.  
Gerald Holton applied thematic analysis to physics, his field of expertise. Since 
analogies from physics are pervasive in economics, his thematic framework is particularly 
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relevant for our study. Furthermore, our consideration of the psychological aspects of 
analogical reasoning augments Holton’s approach. For instance, the recognition of analogies 
as cognitive tools for uncertainty connects thematic analysis with Kuhn’s cycle of scientific 
revolutions. Specifically, our expectation that the use of analogies will increase in the parts 
of Kuhn’s cycle where uncertainty is higher is based on our psychological approach. 
Analogies for Economic Models 
In this section we first present the historical context of the introduction of influential 
analogies into economics; second, we outline the methodological themata implied by those 
analogies; and finally, we construct a thematic map that provides means for answering our 
research questions.  
We recognize two major families of analogies in economics: those from physics and 
those from the life sciences. We also consider an additional case: analogies from complexity 
science. Complexity science is a new scientific paradigm that represents a meeting point of 
physics and life sciences and perhaps an emerging trend in economics (Holt, Rosser, & 
Colander, 2011). We devote a separate subsection to the historical details of the evolution 
of mathematical models in economics. The relevant historical context includes mostly 
events that took place within physics but also the probabilistic revolution, which represents 
a special case of a scientific revolution inspired, in part, by analogies from the social 
sciences. Because physics played a role in the introduction of mathematical modeling in 
economics, that subsection is presented after analogies from physics.  
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Analogies from physics 
Systematic considerations of human economic activities preceded Adam Smith by 
centuries, but at that time the issue was regarded as a part of ethics.5 Bringing his affection 
for mechanistic philosophy to the subject, Smith divorced economic concerns from moral 
philosophy and set the stage for their future quantitative treatment. The discontinuity was 
so radical that it was recognized as the emergence of a new discipline. A shared belief in 
economic laws6 as natural laws among classical economists suggests that the change was 
part of a more general process, the Enlightenment revolution.  
Further progress of the new discipline can be attributed primarily to the 
development of two interrelated concepts: marginalism and general equilibrium. Jevons and 
Carl Menger are widely recognized as progenitors of the marginal revolution in economics. 
Inspired by the “field” theories of Michael Faraday and James Clark Maxwell, Jevons 
undertook the first steps to formalize Jeremy Bentham’s concept of utility,7 foundational for 
the future theory of consumer choice and operationalization of the equilibrium idea 
(Beinhocker, 2006; Mirowski, 1989).  
A fundamental contribution, in terms of general equilibrium theory, came from the 
Lausanne School of economics, also known as the Mathematical School (Walras, 
1874/1954). Two central figures of the school, Walras and Pareto,8 were both engineers. 
                                                     
 
5 For instance, human economic activities became a topic of systematic analysis in the work of Scholastic philosophers such 
as Thomas Aquinas or Albert the Great. In general, economic considerations that predate A. Smith’s An Inquiry Into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, which announced the beginning of modern economics, are widely recognized 
as the era of Scholastic economics. 
6
 A prominent example is Say’s law, an economic principle formulated by the French classical economist Jean-Baptiste Say, 
which claims that total demand in an economy cannot exceed or fall below its total supply. 
7
 In one of his illustrative explanations of utility, Jevons stated that “utility is an attraction between a wanting being and 
what is wanted” and is “just” like “the gravitating force of a material body” (cited in Cohen, 1994, p. 43). 
8
 For more details on the mechanistic philosophy of Pareto’s work on economics, sociology, and political theory, see 
Pareto, Economics and Society: The Mechanical Analogy, by Michael McLure (2001). 
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Origins of Walras’s revolutionary theory can be traced back to Louis Poinsot’s9 
considerations of the equilibrium tendencies of dynamic forces of moving bodies. In a paper 
from 1909, Walras argued that differential equations from his theory are identical to those 
employed in the explanation of behavior of two physical systems, namely, the equilibrium of 
a lever and the motion of planets based on celestial mechanics (Cohen, 1994). The problem 
of constrained optimization implemented in Walras’s model was not new to Pareto,10 who 
introduced a new optimality concept and further improved the model. The influence of 
Walras’s work, which Schumpeter (1954/1994, p. 827) compared with achievements in 
theoretical physics, was so far-reaching that his approach has become the main determinant 
of economic methodology ever since.  
Irving Fisher and Paul Samuelson, seminal characters in modern neoclassical 
economics, were both trained physicists and strongly influenced by Willard Gibbs,11 founder 
of the field of chemical thermodynamics. Trying to advance Walras’s theory, Fisher was 
among the first to incorporate thermodynamics in the general equilibrium approach, but it 
was Samuelson who extensively explored the thermodynamic analogy. In his influential 
Ph.D. thesis, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Samuelson, 1947), which instantaneously 
after publication became a standard part of the modern economics curriculum, Samuelson 
applied a mathematical apparatus from classical thermodynamics to reshape almost all 
                                                     
 
9
 Louis Poinsot was a French physicist. William Jaffe, the leading authority on Walras’s work, hypothesized that Walras’s 
theory was strongly influenced by Poinsot’s popular-at-the-time textbook Elements of Static (first published in 1803), based 
on a letter in which Walras disclosed to a friend that he had first read the book at the age of 19 and had used it frequently 
throughout his life (Jaffe, 1965). Jaffe especially stressed the importance of the second chapter of Poinsot’s book, “On 
Condition of Equilibrium Expressed by Means of Equations” (Beinhocker, 2006). 
10
 Pareto described his first reaction to Walras’s equations: “These equations do not seem new to me; I know them well, 
they are old friends. They are the equations of rational mechanics” (cited in Cohen, 1994, p. 41).  
11
 One of the most important names in the revolution in physics and chemistry at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, 
Gibbs was Fisher's Ph.D. thesis mentor, but his influence on Samuelson was transferred through another of Gibbs’s 
students, Edwin Bidwell Wilson. 
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aspects of economic theory12 (Lo & Mueller, 2010). His assimilation of Keynesian 
macroeconomics into the neoclassical microeconomic framework was critical for the 
establishment of the neoclassical synthesis as a dominant theory of modern economics. 
The import from physics into finance is particularly evident. Writing on the problem 
of option pricing in his Ph.D. thesis in 1900, French mathematician Louis Bachelier borrowed 
Joseph Fourier’s probabilistic formula for the diffusion of heat through a substance to 
approximate the behavior of an option’s underlying asset. A few decades later, this 
assumption became the main reference point of the optimal portfolio theory (Markowitz, 
1952), the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964) and the option pricing theory (Black & 
Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973), three major building blocks of modern financial theory 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2010). A neoclassical account of financial market behavior in full 
accordance with Bachelier’s assumption was provided by Eugene Fama and Samuelson in 
the efficient market hypothesis.  
It was Benoit Mandelbrot (1963) who collected early empirical evidence that 
financial markets deviate from predictions of the mainstream theory based on the efficient 
market hypothesis. Growing criticism of linear stochastic explanations facilitated the 
introduction of nonlinear dynamic analysis, recently developed in physics and particularly in 
chaos theory, in economics.  Tools of modern financial analysis, such as power laws, 
statistical mechanics, scaling arguments, random matrix theory, and ultrametric 
correlations, among others, confirm that nowadays financial markets belong to physicists as 
much as to economists (Farmer, Shubik, & Smith, 2005; Lo & Mueller, 2010). Mantegna and 
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 In his later writing on Foundations of Economic Analysis, Samuelson (1998, p. 1376) emphasized how he realized early on 
that economics and physics share the same formal mathematical theorems despite not resting on the same empirical 
foundation. In his interpretation, his economic models are nothing but mathematical isomorphism to those in 
thermodynamics (Samuelson, 1960).    
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Stanley (2000) announced the emergence of “econophysics,” and Farmer et al. (2005) 
described the recent institutional development of the new field. 
We selected four concepts from physics responsible for shaping methodological 
positions in economics and finance. These are the mechanistic model, the thermodynamic 
model, the model of chaos, and the model of statistical mechanics. The first two found wide 
application in economics, and the second two, while not being that popular among 
economists, introduced significant novelties in economic modeling. To avoid repetition, 
after presenting the methodological presuppositions of the mechanistic model, we present 
only the novelties from subsequent models that changed a previously established 
methodological view. For this reason, for instance, we omit the evident role of classical 
electrodynamics, as its methodological influence falls under the mechanistic model.  
Analogies from mechanics 
Classical mechanics is based on the assumption that the world is governed by 
universal laws. In a so-called Newtonian or Laplace’s world, any state of the universe can be 
inferred from its initial conditions, given that we know the underlying physical laws. In 
simple words, if we have all the pieces of information, we “only” need to put them together 
to get the full picture. This approach was built while trying to understand “simple” physical 
phenomena, such as the behavior of falling objects or the interaction of moving objects but 
also the dynamics of celestial bodies.  
 The application of the mechanistic model to economic theory with examples of 
marginalism and general equilibrium theory was detailed above. The philosophy that 
physical phenomena can be explained by strictly following the cause-and-effect relationship 
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between events gave rise to several methodological presuppositions13: reductionism, closed 
system, reversibility, and equilibrium.  
 Reductionism. From the reductionist perspective, complex phenomena are just 
manifestations of universal laws that operate on the microscopic level. The reduction 
presupposition14 states that all features of a complex phenomenon can be explained by 
analyzing the interaction of an arbitrarily small number of its fundamental parts. Macro-
level explanations are then obtained by the aggregation of analyzed interactions. We call 
this form of reductionism “strong reductionism.” 
In physics, substances are disentangled to molecules and atoms, forces are broken 
down into vectors, fields into waves, waves into photons, and so forth. To arrive at the 
understanding of the behavior of many gas particles, for instance, it is sufficient if one 
explains the interaction of only two particles. An example is Boltzmann’s kinetic theory of 
gases. Similarly, orthodox economics decomposes complex social structures into individual 
consumers and firms. The economic reductionism goes even further by defining a 
representative agent,15 or a utility maximizer, whose actions can be “added up” in a simple 
way so that they actually represent aggregate choices in the economy (Kirman, 1992). 
Essentially, understanding the behavior of a single agent is assumed to be sufficient for 
building a macroeconomic model. The standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model, for instance, relies on the assumption of a representative agent (Colander, Howitt, 
Kirman, Leijonhufvud, & Mehrling, 2008). 
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 More than three decades ago, John Moorhouse (1978) outlined mechanistic principles used in economic methodology, 
as well as their potential implications for economics. 
14
 In social science as well as in economics, the reduction principle is usually labeled methodological individualism, or its 
utilization as the microfoundation of analysis. The branch of economics based on methodological individualism is known as 
microeconomics.  
15
 “The idea that an individual behaves in accordance with certain typical patterns was essential for shaping economics as 
science” (Prokhorov, 2001, p. 6). 
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 Closed system. Physical phenomena of the natural world are complex, and 
accounting for all the relevant factors that determine possible outcomes is beyond reach. To 
distill cause-and-effect relationships between factors of interest it is necessary to isolate 
them from the rest of the world. In practical terms, this means designing conditions in which 
exogenous factors cannot intervene and contaminate the observation. The applicability of 
isolation depends on the nature and complexity of phenomena. For instance, falling of a 
physical object can be relatively easily isolated, while weather phenomena cannot. 
Therefore, isolation is in a close relationship with the scope of scientific observation.  
Classical mechanics is by and large a science of closed systems. To study the paths of, 
say, falling objects, their collisions, or gas particle interactions without unwelcome 
disturbances, classical physicists constructed isolated chambers, containers, gas balloons, 
and so forth. The observation was also confined to a small number of interacting factors. On 
the other hand, isolation in economics was mostly hypothetical because it could not be 
externally enforced. For instance, ceteris paribus,16 a widely used assumption in economics, 
is based on the premise that all factors that are not part of an observation stay constant. 
Similarly, the scope of observation was relatively limited. An example is a model of partial 
equilibrium that considers a single good market while assuming that there are no 
interactions with other markets. However, the mechanistic analogy also inspired an analysis 
that includes multiple markets, namely, general equilibrium analysis. 
Reversible processes. Any process captured by mechanical laws can be reversed back 
to its initial state by the same laws that govern that process. In formal terms, dynamic 
equations that stand for the process are invariant to a change in the sign of time. This 
quality of mechanistic processes is known as reversibility. An illustration of a reversible 
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 A Latin phrase for “all other things being equal.” 
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process is the swing of a frictionless pendulum. Reversible processes are not exclusively 
related to any specific point in time, as they can be returned to their initial state and 
performed again. This is why it is appropriate to say that mechanical processes are 
ahistorical. 
In classical physics, any formal mechanistic model implicitly assumes reversibility. 
The kinetic theory of gases was relatively successful at predicting gas behavior because, in 
reality, relativistic and quantum-mechanical effects in many gases are negligible and their 
processes are hence almost reversible. The same applies to Walras’s general equilibrium 
theory, which is a mechanistic model. Therefore, equilibrium processes of market price 
formations are assumed to be at least approximately reversible in this model.17  
 Equilibrium. When moved from the steady state, mechanistic processes tend to 
regain stability. In other words, if a force is applied to a mechanistic system, disturbing its 
balance, interacting forces tend to balance again. The formal expression of such an 
interaction, in which the corresponding vectors finally result in the outcome vector, is 
known as equilibrium calculus. 
An example from physics is the mechanical lever, whose simple mechanism is about 
balancing between two opposing forces. The concept of the mechanical lever has been an 
important analogical model for the development of marginalism and general equilibrium 
theory.18 Equilibrium is the most widely adopted principle in economics and the trademark 
of economic analysis. On the micro level, it is intimately related to maximizing the behavior 
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 Although the implications of reversibility in economics are not straightforward, there is ample empirical evidence that 
contradicts the reality of this assumption. The phenomenon of increasing returns inherent in various economic activities is 
an example of the path dependence of economic processes (Arthur, 1989). Since the nature of the issue is very technical 
we do not pursue the principle in the second part of the study. 
18
 In his seminal contribution, The Theory of Political Economy, published in 1871, Jevons formally described the lever 
mechanism (with a drawing), explaining in much detail the direct analogical parallels between the lever and his theory of 
exchange (Jevons, 1871/1888). It is worth saying again that Walras used the same analogy for his description of general 
equilibrium theory (Walras, 1909).  
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of market agents, and on the macro level to the formation of the overall market price. The 
former is related to marginalism and the latter to general equilibrium theory. 
Analogies from thermodynamics 
Thermodynamics is the study of relationships between the macroscopic state 
variables (e.g., pressure, temperature, energy, etc.) of a physical system when it is subject to 
change. In contrast to the mechanistic model, the focus is shifted from a difficult-to-observe 
micro level to a macro level that is easy to observe and measure. This led to observation of 
macro-level regularities known as the laws of thermodynamics. The established laws are 
essentially macroscopic-level constraints, which provide a valuable reference point for 
potential microscopic explanations.  
Interpretations of the thermodynamic analogy in economics vary, because of the 
flexibility of its framework. Here, we pay special attention to Samuelson’s application of 
equilibrium thermodynamics to market allocation problems,19 which had major implications 
for mainstream economic theory. There are at least two additional research programs in 
economics that stem from thermodynamics. One studies the use of materials and energy in 
consumption and production, and another studies macro sustainability of global economic 
systems (Ruth, 1996). Development of a novel perception of the economic system as an 
open system, assuming irreversibility, nonlinear dynamics, and nonequilibrium processes, 
has been significantly supported by insights from modern thermodynamics (Daly, 1968; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1966). Besides statistical mechanics, this is another example in which 
modern physics played a role, albeit relatively limited, in mainstream economic theory.  
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 The main reference point here will be the analysis of Samuelson’s model by Eric Smith and Duncan Foley (2008). 
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Samuelson’s thermodynamic analogy did not introduce novel themata but mostly 
reinterpreted thematic positions established in the mechanistic model. Although 
thermodynamics is not reductionist per se, the analogy was applied so that an individual 
economic agent was represented as a macroscopic system characterized by analogous 
macroscopic state variables. This interpretation of “economic particles” preserved their 
deterministic treatment and maintained the reductionist character of the model. 
Furthermore, the interactions between economic agents were limited to trade, which is an 
example of the closed system of isolation. Then the laws of thermodynamics were applied 
to the trade interactions modeled as the utility exchange, which eventually led to the 
equilibrium price formation. Therefore, equilibrium was preserved as a central concept in 
describing market behavior. Only reversibility was refuted, which was a matter of 
interpretation rather than a consequence that follows inevitably from thermodynamic 
equilibrium20 (E. Smith & Foley, 2008).  
Analogies from chaos theory 
Classical chaos theory is the study of behavior of nonlinear deterministic systems, 
which can be observed in a variety of real-world phenomena. This can be understood as an 
attempt of physics to get involved in the more “complicated” aspects of physical reality, 
later labeled complex systems. Dynamic chaos models are characterized by intrinsically 
generated stochasticity and high sensitivity to initial conditions and parameter values 
(Prokhorov, 2001). The former means that these models exhibit irregular behavior, which 
practically is hard to distinguish from pure random patterns. The latter means that even a 
very small difference in initial conditions can have a huge impact on the outcomes. On a 
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 In fact, Smith and Foley (2008) argued that irreversible transformations are generally not predictable in equilibrium 
theories and suggested that considering reversible transformation is more consistent with the equilibrium framework. 
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conceptual level, chaos theory studies mathematical properties of deterministic nonlinear 
models and tries to explore how they relate to observed features of complex systems. The 
realm of complex systems includes the majority of natural systems such as organisms, 
ecosystems, and climate, and various products of human activity such as urban areas, social 
networks, or financial markets. For instance, the observation of weather phenomena played 
an important role in understanding the context of a large number of interacting factors and 
their nonlinear interdependencies.  
An early prototype model in nonlinear economic analysis was a nonlinear business 
cycle model introduced by Kaldor (1940; Lorenz, 1993). With new assumptions, nonlinear 
macroeconomic models were able to simulate endogenously generated erratic behavior, 
which previously was typically modeled by means of external random shocks. Such models 
were more apt to explain tipping points, fractal patterns, and long-term memories, 
properties that financial markets regularly exhibit. 
 Chaos theory as a study of system dynamics is not directly concerned with 
microscopic processes of the system. However, the insights from the observation of chaotic 
systems carry important implications for reductionist theories. An intrinsic sensitivity to 
initial conditions of chaotic systems together with small initial errors, inevitable given that 
initial conditions can only be approximated, generates huge mistakes in outcome 
predictions.21 In the model of chaos, isolation is applied on an entirely different level 
because the focus is shifted from observation of a few objects or forces to observation of 
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 This conclusion can be traced back to Henri Poincaré, who summarized it in 1903: “Even if it were the case that the 
natural laws had no longer any secrets for us, we could still only know the initial situation approximately. If that enabled us 
to predict the succeeding situation with the same approximation, that is all we require, and we should say that the 
phenomenon had been predicted, that it is governed by [deterministic] laws. But it is not always so; it may happen that 
small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomenon. A small error in the former will 
produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon” (cited 
in Prokhorov, 2001, pp. 9–10). 
 
 
36 
large systems with numerous interacting factors, such as ecosystems. Furthermore, chaotic 
processes are irreversible and path dependent. This implies that time matters and that the 
chronology of events determines historical outcomes. An illustrative example is a market 
phenomenon known as increasing returns (Arthur, 1989). Finally, chaos theory is concerned 
with processes that are rather far from equilibrium and searches for patterns in apparently 
irregular behavior of dynamic systems. This is supported by the observation that almost no 
processes in nature are in steady states, and even among those that are, equilibrium states 
are only their special cases. Moreover, there are strong indications that complex systems 
require far-from-equilibrium conditions to maintain self-organization or growth (Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984). 
Analogies from statistical mechanics 
Statistical mechanics applies probability theory to study behavior of mechanical 
systems. Instead of tracing the dynamics of individual microscopic particles of the system, 
statistical mechanics deals with their average behavior. The novelty of the probabilistic 
approach led to establishing the missing connection between microscopic processes and 
macroscopic quantities, observed and measured in classical thermodynamics. Calculation of 
pressure in a gas system based on statistical mechanics, for instance, disregards the record 
of any particular gas particle and calculates on average how many particles per time unit hit 
the wall of the gas chamber.  
Unlike in the cases of mechanistic and thermodynamic analogies, methods of 
statistical mechanics were not introduced to the field by economists, but by physicists 
themselves (Jovanovic & Schinckus, 2013). Examples of applications are the use of 
multifractal models in econometrics, or scaling laws in modeling income, wealth, or firm 
distributions. On the theoretical level, the probabilistic perspective opened new doors for 
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dealing with the aggregation problem, which previously led to the development of highly 
unrealistic single-actor macroeconomic models. The main benefit is that modeling of 
collective actions does not require sacrifice of agents’ interactions because of the limitations 
of the theoretical framework (Lux, 2008).  
Since the focus is not on individual behavior of microscopic particles but on statistical 
properties of their collective actions, a different sort of reductionism is assumed, which we 
refer to as weak reductionism. The interest in collective behavior and applications of 
statistical mechanics in modeling interactions in complex social phenomena (Galam, 1986; 
Weidlich, 1971) implies that isolation is practically shifted to the level of complex systems. 
Statistical mechanics is also applied outside equilibrium, in which modeling irreversible 
processes plays a major role.  
Evolution of mathematical models in economics 
French mathematician Antoine Augustin Cournot is widely considered a pioneer of 
mathematical economics. In the first half of the 19th century he introduced the notion of 
function in economic analysis, deriving the law of supply and demand as a function of price. 
Mathematics was the main instrument in the work of Jevons, Edgeworth, Walras, and 
Pareto. Their legacy in terms of marginal revolution and general equilibrium theory has 
made the mathematization of economics irreversible. John Hicks, a British economist and 
mathematician, made important improvements to Walras’s model and introduced Walras’s 
work to the English-speaking world. Since the Walrasian model left ample room for 
mathematical improvement, it was further advanced by mathematicians22 in the mid-20th 
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 Mathematicians played one of the critical roles in economics of the 20th century. For instance, the two most influential 
macroeconomists of that time, John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, were both trained mathematicians. Just as 
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century. With the contributions of Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu, and John Nash, the 
model reached full axiomatization. 
Despite being a social science, economics started using mathematical formalism as 
its main language not long after Adam Smith. Mathematics entered economics via physics, 
and their influences on economics are closely related. Three turning points in the history of 
natural sciences have significantly changed formal modeling in economics: The first was the 
spreading of a natural philosophy of universal laws that encouraged economists to adopt 
mathematical models from classical physics; the second was when the probabilistic 
revolution transformed a deterministic worldview into a stochastic one; and the third was 
when a worldview with normally distributed phenomena and linear models was confronted 
with a worldview of power laws and nonlinearities. In what follows we describe four 
influential mathematical worldviews used in economics.  
Linear deterministic model 
Linear models are based on the assumption that the interactions of different isolated 
phenomena occur in an additive manner. The principle of superposition,23 which directly 
reflects the Newtonian linear paradigm, implies that “the most general motion of a 
complicated system of particles is nothing more than a linear superposition of the motions 
of the constituent elements” (West, 1985, cited in Lorenz, 1993, p. 13). In this worldview, 
the initial conditions and set of linear equations capturing the observed processes allow for 
deterministic predictions. Since classical physics was the exemplar model of the time, it is no 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Fisher and Samuelson promoted mathematics before them, scholars of the highly influential Chicago school of economics 
championed a strong mathematical culture. Some of the most important scholars of the Chicago school were Frank Knight, 
Georg Stigler, Milton Friedman, Gary Backer, Robert Lucas, and Eugene Fama.  
23
 Superposition is a mathematical characteristic of linear models that is defined as follows: If two inputs 𝑥𝑥a and 𝑥𝑥b have 
outputs 𝑦𝑦a and 𝑦𝑦b, respectively, then in a linear model the input 𝑥𝑥a + 𝑥𝑥b will give the output 𝑦𝑦a + 𝑦𝑦b. 
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surprise that early economics was linear24 (Lorenz, 1993). While deterministic models are 
more rare, linear models are still commonplace in modern economics. The Smets–Wouters 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, which the European Central Bank used prior 
to the crisis, is an example of a linear model. 
Linear stochastic model 
Events that led to the probabilistic revolution involved observation of social rather 
than natural phenomena. This is a quite rare example in the history of science of the natural 
sciences learning from the social sciences. Even though some forms of risk assessment were 
used in the ancient civilizations of China, Babylon, Greece, and Rome (Nozer & Wilson, 
2008), the first use of probability calculus is commonly associated with the discourse 
between Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat on problems relating to games of chance. At 
around the same time, insurance companies started using simple statistical methods to 
assess the likelihood of shipwrecks, fires, or similar accidents against which their customers 
wanted protection. The first known application of the probability calculus in physics 
occurred when Pierre Simon, marquis de Laplace, the French mathematician, took 
advantage of probabilistic techniques to circumvent the problem of measurement errors 
made by astronomical instruments. Laplace realized that errors in telescopic observations 
formed a particular pattern. Not long afterward, Adrien-Marie Legendre and Carl Friedrich 
Gauss provided a mathematical formalization of the normal distribution. The next advance, 
however, took place in the backyard of social science, when Adolphe Quetelet25 
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 A linear worldview can be observed, for example, in the writing of classical economist John Stuart Mill in 1844: “There 
are not a law and an exception to that law—the law acting in ninety-nine cases, and the exception in one. There are two 
laws, each possibly acting in the whole hundred cases, and bringing about a common effect by their conjunct operation” 
(cited in Prokhorov, 2001, p. 7). 
25
 Quetelet, an astronomer and a student of Laplace, introduced the term “social physics,” giving a clear hint about the 
origins of the analogy for his theorizing about social phenomena. He recognized normality in records of births, marriages, 
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demonstrated the power of statistical techniques to deal with large demographic databases 
in order to make population-level predictions. Quetelet’s contribution was evidently a key 
inspiration for Boltzmann and Maxwell to use statistical tools and independently derive gas 
theories on a completely novel basis (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 45). Their work soon 
inspired revision of classical physics and led to the development of statistical physics.  
The probability revolution had a particularly important role in financial and 
macroeconomic models that were naturally focused on capturing the dynamics of the 
economy. Probability was introduced in finance by Bachelier at the very beginning of the 
20th century. However, that was one man’s intuition rather than a product of economic 
thought of the time.26 Accumulation of financial time series posed a serious challenge in 
terms of understanding the mathematical properties of functions describing observed 
fluctuations of macroeconomic and financial fundamentals. In addition to linearity, 
Bachelier’s type27 of stochasticity strongly characterized economic modeling in the first half 
of the 20th century. Since that time, the normality assumption has been used to model 
fluctuations in all kinds of physical and social phenomena. 
In finance, the normality assumption suggests that movements of market prices form 
the bell curve. Known also as Gaussian, the normal distribution belongs to a class of 
parametric distributions with a very convenient mathematical property, namely, that it can 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
deaths, suicides, crimes, etc. He is also known for his idealistic concept of the average man that supposedly can be used as 
a standardized agent for modeling social phenomena. It is also worth mentioning that credit for the discovery of “social 
laws” by means of probabilistic interpretation is typically shared between Quetelet and Henry Thomas Buckle (Gigerenzer 
et al., 1989). 
26
 A few decades later an awareness of the discrepancy between economic modeling and economic reality started to 
develop. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1924, Wesley Mitchell said, “The statistical 
view involves the notions of variety, of probability, of approximation…. The mechanical type of speculation works with the 
notions of sameness, of certainty, of invariant laws. In economics these notions do not fit the phenomena closely. Hence 
we must put our trust in observations” (cited in Prokhorov, 2001, p. 8).  
27
 Bachelier’s original model of price movements has been revised by many authors (Kendall & Hill, 1953) who assumed 
that return rates but not stock prices follow Brownian motion. Thus, in modified models the oscillations of stock prices 
form a log-normal distribution rather than the normal distribution proposed by Bachelier. 
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be characterized by only two parameters, mean and variance. The latter has become the 
ultimate measure of risk in modern finance. 
Nonlinear deterministic model 
The mathematical concept of chaos brought one of the last significant changes to 
economic modeling in the 20th century. About four decades after Poincaré showed that 
seemingly stochastic behavior can be generated from a deterministic process, Kaldor (1940) 
introduced nonlinearities in a business cycle model. Popularization of nonlinear modeling in 
economics can be largely attributed to Mandelbrot (Mirowski, 1990). The result was that 
assumptions of linearity, independence, stationarity, and normal distributions were 
challenged with nonlinearity, time dependence, nonstationarity, and power laws 
(Mandelbrot & Hudson, 2010). Some pioneers of chaos in economics were William Brock, 
Blake LeBaron, Richard Day, and James Ramsey (Prokhorov, 2001). The uncovering of long-
term memories in financial data is an illustration of how the concept of chaos gradually 
advanced the understanding of financial markets, debunking some deeply entrenched 
assumptions of the neoclassical model (Lillo, Mike, & Farmer, 2005). 
Nonlinear stochastic model 
Achieving a clear distinction between high-order chaos and an infinite dimensional 
(stochastic) process is still a work in progress, as well as determining which of the two is a 
better descriptor of macroeconomic dynamics (Brock & Malliaris, 1989). The most 
representative of nonlinear stochastic models is the ARCH (autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity) model proposed by Robert Engel in 1982. Generalized by Tim Bollerslev 
(GARCH), the model encouraged a large amount of subsequent research that resulted in a 
whole class of ARCH models (Bollerslev, 2010). The most distinctive innovation introduced 
by ARCH is the treatment of time dependencies in higher order moments (such as variance 
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and covariance). This so-called conditional treatment of variables, in which their current 
values depend on the past states of the world, was motivated by clustered volatility 
observed in the financial markets (Bollerslev, Chou, & Kroner, 1992). 
Analogies from the life sciences  
Alfred Marshall’s (1890/1920, p.19) well-known statement, “The Mecca of the 
economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics,” is widely considered 
an early indication that biology can be a valuable source of inspiration for economics28 
(Daly, 1968; Hodgson, 1997). Another early hint came from the leading institutionalist 
Thorstein Veblen, who in 1898 entitled a paper “Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary 
Science?” and coined the term evolutionary economics. The leader of alternative economic 
thought at the time, Veblen criticized the neoclassical paradigm by pointing out that 
uncertainty, complexity, and emergence are inherent properties of economic reality. There 
are at least four distinctive evolutionary approaches in economics (Witt, 2008). First, 
probably the most prominent evolutionary economist, Joseph Schumpeter (1912/1934), 
held that the concept of natural evolution is inappropriate to deal with the fast progress of 
capitalist societies. In his at-the-time radical theory of business cycles, Schumpeter 
identified technological innovation as the primary source of “creative destruction.” In the 
Schumpeterian framework, entrepreneurs are the main generators of change and 
discontinuity in an otherwise self-balancing economic reality. Second, while acknowledging 
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 Even though he never formally developed the biological analogy (Thomas, 1991), Marshall insisted on including this 
statement in all subsequent editions of his classic textbook, Principles of Economics. Marshall (1890/1920, p. 19) justified 
his inconsistency as follows: “The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics. But 
biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics; a volume on Foundations must therefore give a 
relatively large place to mechanical analogies; and frequent use is made of the term ‘equilibrium,’ which suggests 
something of statical analogy.” Moreover, in the later appendixes of the book he characterized economics as a branch of 
biology (Thoben, 1982).  
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certain specifics of social and economic evolution, Veblen (1898), Georgescu-Roegen (1971), 
and Hayek (1971) were strongly inspired by the ideas of natural evolution. Some of their 
important evolutionary concerns were innovation and human creativity; processes of 
novelty dissemination, such as imitation and learning; and sustainable growth and long-term 
development. Third, in their seminal book, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Nelson and Winter (1982) developed a comprehensive evolutionary framework, adopting 
abstract principles of natural selection without strictly sticking to Darwinian ontology.29 The 
model was the first highly formalized framework designed to address the question of how 
novelty, innovation, and change are endogenously generated in the economic system. 
Finally, Hodgson and Knudsen’s approach (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2006), labeled by Witt 
(2008) as “universal Darwinism,” embraced the Darwinian worldview and natural selection 
as the most promising explanatory framework for addressing evolution in both natural and 
social domains of reality. 
Another independent branch of economic research found inspiration in ecology. 
Ecology is often referred to as the economy of nature (Costanza, 1996). Both economics and 
ecology study the allocation of scarce resources, one in humans and the other in the rest of 
the living world.30 Stressing strong connections between the fields, some authors began to 
protest against this artificial separation of two segments of reality and their mutual 
disregard (Daly, 1968). Moreover, attempts to bridge the gap arose on both sides. Since the 
beginnings of ecology as a science there has been a tendency to account for the human 
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 They described their pragmatic attitude as follows: “We emphatically disavow any intention to pursue biological 
analogies for their own sake, or even for the sake of progress toward an abstract, higher-level evolutionary theory that 
would incorporate a range of existing theories. We are pleased to exploit any idea from biology that seems helpful in the 
understanding of economic problems, but we are equally prepared to pass over anything that seems awkward, or to 
modify accepted biological theories radically in the interest of getting better economic theory” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 
11). 
30
 These were originally common points of view in both fields. Unlike modern ecology, mainstream economics is still very 
close to its initial position. 
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factor. H. T. Odum (1971), Meadows, Meadows, Randers, and Behrens (1972), and Holling 
(1973) were early proponents of the holistic ecological view (Costanza, 1996). Influenced by 
Georgescu-Roegen, Kenneth Boulding (1966) and Herman Daly (1968) popularized the use 
of the concept of entropy when studying the relationship between the economic system 
and the environment. This inspired the establishment of environmental economics, a 
branch of the mainstream approach that employs standard economic analysis to study the 
ecological costs of human economic activity. Externalities, market failures, overharvesting of 
resources, and environmental degradation have been addressed primarily for the sake of 
sustainable economic development. However, in the 1980s, one group took a more radical 
position (Daly, Richard Norgaard, and Matthias Ruth, among others) and together with like-
minded ecologists (Robert Costanza, Charles Hall, Ann-Mari Jansson, H. T. Odum, David 
Pimentel, and others) organized a series of seminars on the integration of ecology and 
economics. The joint effort culminated in 1988 when the International Society of Ecological 
Economics was founded, and a year later the journal Ecological Economics published its first 
issue. The leading authors persisted in presenting transdisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity 
as deliberate and essential qualities of the new field (Costanza, 1996). Accordingly, we 
recognize two major concepts from the life sciences that found use in economics: 
evolutionary theory and ecology.  
Analogies from evolutionary theory 
Change occupies a central position in any evolutionary approach. Consequently, the 
main interest is placed on studying processes rather than states. In particular, evolutionary 
biology studies adaptive changes in the heritable features of biological populations acquired 
under environmental pressure over generations. Evolution is a very broad concept relevant 
to a variety of phenomena, yet there are certain innate properties of evolutionary ideas that 
 
 
45 
hold across its various applications. In fact, many of those properties have been explicitly 
discussed within evolutionary economics (Fagerberg, 2002; Hodgson, 1998). 
 Discontinuity. In addition to incremental dynamics, mostly characterized by slow and 
quantitative change, evolutionary theory emphasizes discontinuous dynamics described by 
sudden and qualitative change. The study of discontinuities therefore deals with disturbing 
factors of the system’s stability, and far-from-equilibrium concepts are of particular 
relevance. The ultimate form of discontinuity in evolution is the emergence of novel 
structures or functions. Emergence is a systemic process through which properties and or 
structures come into being that are unexpected, given the known attributes of component 
agents and environmental forces31 (Lichtenstein & McKelvey, 2011). Emergent features are 
understood as an organism’s responses to adaptive pressure that require constant struggle 
with an ever-changing environment. Organisms with acquired adaptive features are more 
likely to survive, further disseminating those features in the population. 
Even though, or maybe because, much of natural evolution can be associated with 
incremental change, evolutionary biologists are particularly interested in emergent 
properties of organisms. For instance, the question of how the cell evolved to be an 
independent functional entity, or even more fundamentally, how life emerged from 
nonorganic matter, are deep concerns of evolutionary biology. Similarly, evolutionists in 
economics are interested in the change of structural and organizational properties of the 
economic system, more than in pure augmentation of old structures. The emergence of 
companies and institutions, as well as new organizational structures, is a corresponding 
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 Emergence is a complex and controversial concept, but at the same time it is widely considered to be the central 
property of complex systems. For more detail, see Lichtenstein and McKelvey (2011). 
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example of interest in evolutionary economics. Emergence and dissemination of novelty are 
generally identified as generators of economic development32 (Witt, 1996). 
In evolutionary economics, it is common to make a distinction between approaches 
that model innovation endogenously and exogenously. For instance, in Nelson and Winter’s 
model the innovation process is placed within the system. They also demonstrate that the 
heterogeneity of existing structures and its continuous restoration are critical requirements 
for the system’s ability to generate innovations (Fagerberg, 2002). In contrast, the 
Schumpeterian model perceives creative individuals (i.e., entrepreneurs) as the main source 
of novelty that brings innovations to the system from the outside.33 
 Complex systems. The evolutionary process takes place in a complex environment 
characterized by uncertainty, nonlinearity, and irreversible processes. Complexity in this 
context results from the involvement of numerous interacting elements that produce 
emergent phenomena and self-organizational patterns. Nonlinear relationships that are 
typical of such settings are associated with conditions of high uncertainty, which implies 
very limited predictability.  
Complex social structures are pervasive in biology and economics. The cohabitation 
of a great variety of species, their competition for life space and reproduction, as well as the 
struggle for survival in food chains are just a few layers of the complexity in biological 
systems. Similarly, economic systems rest on a large number of interacting agents and 
exhibit various features of complex systems. Bubbles, crashes, herd behavior, and high 
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 Fascination with the progress of capitalism has always been a strong motivation for the evolutionary study of economic 
systems. Consequently, attention in evolutionary economics is directed toward progress and constructive rather than 
destructive processes. However, in ecological economics, this interest shifts in a different direction that will be discussed in 
the next section. 
33
 It is worth saying that the described difference can be largely attributed to the fact that Nelson and Winter’s model 
suffers many practical constraints because of its higher level of formalism. For instance, to include the above-mentioned 
Schumpeterian concerns one needs to formalize the role of creative individuals and science in an economic system. 
 
 
47 
unpredictability of financial markets are common examples. Distinctive human features 
such as foresight and intentionality, communication, and technology seem to further ramify 
human complex systems (Holling, 2001). In trying to account for the complexity of the 
economy, evolutionary models are often analytically intractable, and solutions are instead 
explored through simulations (Fagerberg, 2002). 
 Bounded rationality. Given the uncertainty of the environment and the limited time, 
resources, and cognitive abilities of agents, rational models of “economic man” are highly 
unrealistic (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Simon, 1947). Instead, the concept of bounded 
rationality assumes that agents who have evolved in such real-world conditions are 
equipped with adaptive behavioral rules, or heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2011; Simon, 1955). 
Heuristics are agents’ adaptive responses to the uncertainty of the environment, rather than 
products of an omniscient behavioral mechanism that provides the optimal response to any 
situation (Todd, Gigerenzer, & the ABC Research Group, 2012). 
In the face of inherent constraints imposed by reality, models that assume 
maximizing behavior are pervasive in biology (Hutchinson & Gigerenzer, 2005) and 
dominant in economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, justifications are typically 
different. In biology, optimization is not embedded in unbounded agents, but the 
evolutionary process itself is the optimization agent that selects an adaptively superior 
behavior (Alchian, 1950; Hammerstein, 2001). In economics, the maximizing behavior is, in 
contrast, a product of the as-if models of the human rational mind. In the former case, 
optimization is an attribute of the process and in the latter it is an attribute of the agent. 
However, the importance of bounded rationality is well understood in evolutionary 
economics. For instance, Nelson and Winter’s interpretation of bounded rationality 
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combines Simon’s (1955) satisficing behavior and ideas from Cyert and March’s (1963) 
behavioral theory of the firm.   
Analogies from ecology 
Ecology is an interdisciplinary science that studies interactions between organisms 
and their environment. The environment includes living and nonliving aspects of the 
organisms’ habitat, such as other organisms, geography, or climate. Importantly, they are all 
changing and coevolving together. Therefore, by definition ecology deals with a blend of 
complex systems and their interrelationships. One of the deep concerns of ecology is 
sustainability, which can be simply defined as the capacity to endure (Bromley, 2008). In this 
context, ecologists develop methodologies based on holism, open system analysis, complex 
systems, and resilience. 
Holism. Holism is the idea that properties of complex phenomena cannot be fully 
understood by analyzing only a small number of its fundamental parts. Interactions of 
numerous and often heterogeneous components of complex systems lead to the 
emergence of properties that cannot be scaled up from the observation of a few micro-level 
interactions. Therefore, the holistic approach entails investigating links among general (e.g., 
structural or functional) properties of the system or analyzing the interactions of a large 
number of system components (agents) in the form of computational models (in our 
questionnaire study we refer to the computational models as a “weak reductionism”.   
A typical analysis in ecology is to look for spatial and temporal patterns of driving 
variables (e.g., biodiversity, climate factors, etc.) that are assumed to be related to a 
targeted system property, for example, resilience (Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 
2004). The network approach (Janssen et al., 2006), comparative study of different complex 
systems (Costanza, Kemp, et al., 1993), and agent-based models (Grimm et al., 2006) are 
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typical tools for investigating problems within this framework. Likewise, ecological 
economics harbors a strong holistic view (Costanza, Wainger, Folke, & Mäler, 1993) and 
uses similar methodological techniques for studying socioecological systems (van den Bergh 
& Verbruggen, 1999). 
 Open system. The socioecological system is a concept that integrates economic, 
ecological, and social systems (Holling, 2001). None of the systems is observed strictly in 
isolation; rather, their interaction is the central issue. On the other hand, in mainstream 
economics the economy is by and large treated as a closed system. Interactions with the 
environment or other spheres of human social activity are rarely part of its focus. 
Consequently, in the orthodox methodology, factors that are from the ecological view 
naturally part of a particular analysis are regularly left out. For instance, in his growth model 
of a sustainable economy, Solow (1956) assumed an exogenously determined set of 
preferences and property rights, invariant to the state of the system. In contrast, the 
position of ecological economists is that a model with such assumptions is ignorant of 
feedback loops that are generated in dynamic interactions between human and 
environmental systems (Common & Perrings, 1992). 
 Complex systems. Discontinuities, emergence, nonlinearities, and self-organization 
are inherent to ecosystem dynamics, and they are all descriptors of complex systems (C. R. 
Allen & Holling, 2008). In addition to biological complexity, discussed above, there is 
evidence that human activity tends to introduce further complexities into already complex 
natural environments (Liu et al., 2007). In fact, the socioeconomic system integrates a large 
number of natural and social complex systems, and ecological economics recognizes links 
between human and ecological subsystems as being particularly important (Berkes & Folke, 
1998). Such systems operate far from equilibrium, and concepts of discontinuity, transition, 
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regime shift, tipping points, and instability are essential for understanding their behavior (C. 
R. Allen & Holling, 2008; Scheffer et al., 2012). Unlike evolutionary economics, which deals 
primarily with discontinuities linked to system progress, such as innovations, ecological 
economics is concerned with discontinuities that affect system structures and functions that 
are caused by environmental disturbances. Critical transitions and catastrophic shifts are 
examples of this sort of discontinuity (Scheffer et al., 2009). 
 Resilience. Resilience is a quality that measures the system’s ability to persist. The 
ecological literature recognizes two types of resilience: engineering and ecological (Grimm & 
Calabrese, 2011). Engineering resilience is defined as the rate and speed of return to 
preexisting conditions after disturbance (Holling & Gunderson, 2002). Ecological resilience in 
Holling’s (1973, p. 14) structural view “determines the persistence of relationships within a 
system and is a measure of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, 
driving variables, and parameters, and still persist.” In addition to preservation of structural 
properties of the system, more recently the Resilience Alliance added a functional 
component to the definition: “Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance 
and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al., 2004, p. 5). The difference in the 
definition of engineering and ecological resilience reflects contrasting worldviews. 
Engineering resilience is a stability concept useful for near-equilibrium systems and 
essentially focuses on a single, global equilibrium state (Gunderson, 2000). In such a model 
the major concern is to support a system’s return to equilibrium after a disturbance, which 
is usually exogenous. In contrast, ecological resilience is designed for the far-from-
equilibrium behavior of ecological systems. Multiple equilibria, or rather domains of 
attractions (also called regimes), are acknowledged and even simultaneously considered 
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(Gunderson, 2000). Such an analysis highlights the importance of transitions from one 
regime to another and tipping points as critical events on the transition path (Scheffer et al., 
2009, 2012). 
Analogies from complexity science 
The idea that reductionism as a universal analytical approach has serious limitations 
came from physics. Insights by Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Poincaré ushered in chaos theory. 
From the second half of the 19th century, the foundations of the complex system paradigm 
began to be noticed. Feedback loops (Maxwell, 1868), nonlinearity and sensitivity to initial 
conditions (Poincaré, 1887), self-organization (Ashby, 1947), and irreversible and far-from-
equilibrium dynamics (Prigogine & Defay, 1954) were major insights leading to the new 
paradigm. 
Alexander Bogdanov’s approach (Gorelik, 1975) was an early precursor of the 
alternative holistic approach. In the 1910s Bogdanov outlined the principles of general 
system organization with the idea of unifying physical, biological, and social systems 
(Bogdanov, 1980). Since the Second World War, system analysis has become the main 
determinant of approaches dealing with complex systems (O’Neill, 2001). With roots in 
classical control theory, a branch of engineering research established cybernetics (Wiener, 
1948) and system dynamics (Forrester, 1958). Similarly, research in biology gave rise to 
general system theory (von Bertalanffy, 1950). In 1954 Ludwig von Bertalanffy and others34 
founded the Society for the Advancement of General System Theory.35 Thus, system 
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 Other well-known cofounders were Anatol Rapoport, Ralph Gerard, and Kenneth Boulding.  
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 In 1956 the society was renamed the Society for General System Research and in 1988 it became the International 
Society for the Systems Sciences. 
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thinking emerged in diverse disciplines such as biology (Miller, 1972), ecology (Holling, 1973; 
E. P. Odum, 1953), and psychology (Barker, 1968).  
The idea of a multi-level structure of complexity,36 introduced by Simon (1962), was 
one of the first direct links between system theory and complex systems (Lane, 2006). Since 
then, authors from various fields such as physics (P. W. Anderson, 1972), ecology (T. F. H. 
Allen & Starr, 1982), biology (Salthe, 1985), and computer science (Holland, 1992a) have 
recognized hierarchy as a key principle for understanding the organization of complex 
systems. An even more important message was that such systems, despite the complexity, 
share a relatively simplistic order regardless of their physical, biological, or social nature 
(Simon, 1962).  
The collection of converging interdisciplinary insights led to the development of a 
more specific concept, a complex adaptive system (Holland, 1992b). This kind of complex 
system is described as an adaptive nonlinear network responsive to the environment so that 
it is capable of learning from experience, anticipating change, and adapting accordingly. The 
connections were obvious to some economists who immediately suggested that the model 
of complex adaptive systems is a better way to think about economic phenomena. As a 
result, the first conceptual and formal foundations of complexity economics were developed 
in the late 1980s at the Santa Fe Institute for Complex Systems. 
Apart from the already discussed properties of complex systems, such as nonlinear 
interactions, far-from-equilibrium dynamics, and self-organization, the application of 
complexity approach carried two particular methodological implications for economics 
(Arthur, Durlauf, & Lane, 1997). First, instead of one universal behavioral model, namely, 
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 The concept assumes that subsystems of a system are hierarchically organized, such that each has subordinate 
subsystems eventually leading to elementary subsystems at the bottom of the hierarchy. 
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the rational actor model endorsed in the neoclassical economic theory, complexity 
economics allows that agents endowed with a limited cognitive capacity use a variety of 
cognitive processes while solving problems under uncertainty. Second, the structure of 
economic interactions is important and cannot be represented merely through impersonal 
market relationships, or one-to-one “game theory style” settings. Instead, network 
approaches are suggested as a tool that provides realism to modeling the structure of 
market interactions. Examples of the application across different domains are network 
models of social (Barabási et al., 2002; Brockmann & Helbing, 2013), biological (Albert, 
2005), ecological (McCann, Hastings, & Huxel, 1998), engineering (Guimerà, Mossa, Turtschi, 
& Amaral, 2005), and financial (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Gai, Haldane, & Kapadia, 2011) 
systems. 
A related approach to studying complexity has been agent-based modeling. An early 
example is Schelling’s (1971) model of emergent racial segregation in cities, where 
individuals using simple behavioral rules generate complex social dynamics. Both agent-
based and individual-based simulations have been developed into well-established 
simulation techniques (Grimm et al., 2006). A pioneering work of this kind applied to finance 
was an artificial stock market model developed by researchers from the Santa Fe Institute 
(Palmer, Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, & Tayler, 1994). Founded in 1984, the Santa Fe Institute 
was the first to gather patches of complexity research from different domains in one place. 
John Holland’s (1992a) genetic algorithm, capable of accounting for agents’ adaptive 
behavior, and Langton’s “artificial life” model (Langton, 1986) based on cellular automata, 
had a strong impact on the modeling of complex economic systems (Rosser, 1999). 
Examples are Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) model of artificial societies with multiple markets 
and Albin and Foley’s (1998) model of the evolution of market structures. Large-scale 
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projects such as FOC (Forecasting Financial Crisis) and CRISIS (Complexity Research Initiative 
for Systemic Instabilities), which aim to understand and forecast systemic risk and global 
financial instabilities, illustrate recent trends in complex systems simulations (Farmer et al., 
2012). 
Thematic map 
In what follows, we construct a thematic map to organize the themata presented 
above into congruent methodological worldviews (Figure 2). The complete list of themata 
that appear in the thematic map, sorted into 10 categories, is given in Table 1. The included 
themata are also heterogeneous: Some suggest relatively clear methodological instructions, 
such as reduction and isolation; others are more a consequence of the nature of observed 
phenomena and formal modeling applied, such as reversibility; and some more than others 
are a matter of economic interpretation, such as the rational actor model, which does not 
have a clear corresponding concept in classical physics.  
As shown in Figure 2, we recognize two distinct analogical worldviews in economics: 
The classical physics worldview rooted in the mechanistic and thermodynamic models, and 
the life sciences worldview rooted in the evolutionary, ecological, and complexity models. 
We also find that the chaotic and statistical physics models do not easily fit into either of the 
two categories and alone do not represent a coherent methodological worldview. The 
methodological worldviews are not simple lists of thematic positions but rather can be 
understood as a set of closely interrelated ideas. For instance, reductionism suggests placing 
economic agents in the center of the analysis, whereas equilibrium suggests optimal 
allocations. Together they suggest the rational actor model, especially if strong reductionism 
is assumed, in which macro properties (optimality in this case) are supposed to be reflected 
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at the micro level. Holism, on the other hand, does not require a rational actor as it allows 
that macro properties can be emergent and independent from underlying micro properties. 
Similarly, a rational actor dwells in a certain environment, whereas an agent with bounded 
rationality fits better with an uncertain environment. 
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Figure 2. Analogical worldviews depicted in the thematic map. Themata are labeled with 
capital letters and placed above the doted arrows. Thematic positions are placed at the 
opposite ends of the arrows. 
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This interconnectedness between the thematic positions explains why 
worldviews are resistant to change, as the replacement of a single thematic 
component can affect the remaining components. For instance, salvage of the 
rational actor model in the face of an uncertain economic world required the 
additional assumption that uncertainty can be reduced to risk. In a risky 
environment, in which probabilities associated with all possible outcomes are 
known, a rational actor capable of Bayesian updating can operate and make optimal 
decisions. 
The thematic map also provides a tool for testing our research questions. In 
this context, the thematic map can be understood as a representation of 
methodological space defined by opposing thematic positions (such as strong 
reductionism and holism) located at the ends of the lines representing the themata 
(such as reduction, isolation, etc.). The methodological space of the thematic map is 
continuous. For instance, weak reductionism, even though it is very close to holism, 
belongs in between strong reductionism and holism. Similarly, risky environment 
belongs in between certain and uncertain environment. Since we aim to assess the 
methodology of the economics field, which naturally includes a variety of 
approaches, its average methodological position should be situated within the 
extreme poles of the methodological space. For instance, it is common knowledge 
that present-day economic modeling cannot be completely characterized as linear or 
deterministic. If the classical physics model is taken as a reference point, it is 
reasonable to expect that the position of the contemporary economic methodology 
has shifted rightward, closer to the nonlinear and stochastic ends of the map. 
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Determining the respective methodological positions of mainstream economics 
before and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis is the topic of the next section. 
Analysis of the Economic Literature: Impact of the Recent Financial Crisis 
The global 2007–2009 financial crisis came as a surprise not only to laypeople and 
day-to-day market traders, but also to economists, an intellectual community fully 
devoted to understanding how the economy works. The crisis was a shock for most 
mainstream economists, according to whom such huge market imbalances should 
virtually never happen. Has this dissonance or the increasing critique of the field 
provided intellectual motivation for some economists to rethink their approach? To 
investigate this question, we conducted a study of economic papers published by 
leading economics departments before and after the crisis and searched for any 
signs of change in economic methods and thinking that might have occurred 
between the two periods.  
According to our analogical cycle and Kuhn’s model of scientific revolution, 
discussed in the Introduction, we expected that the financial crisis would renew the 
discussion on mainstream analogies and turn attention to alternative analogies that 
have been largely neglected to date, mainly life sciences analogies. Since our method 
is designed for studying research papers, which do not contain explicit thematic 
considerations (Holton, 1996), we could not directly measure the change in the 
absolute level of analogies. What we measured is the change in the proportion of 
the type of analogical content in the methodology of the targeted papers. Regarding 
the direction of change, we reasoned that the crisis would highlight a long-standing 
criticism of the present-day mainstream economics—that it lacks a deeper 
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appreciation of holism and “system thinking” (Arthur, 2014; Farmer et al., 2012). 
Since holism is one of the fundamental principles of life sciences analogies, such as 
complex adaptive systems, we expected that these analogies would gain more 
prominence after the crisis, possibly at the expense of mechanistic and 
thermodynamic analogies. In particular, we expected the principles that characterize 
biological analogies, such as holism, open systems, discontinuities, nonlinearities, 
bounded rationality, complexity, and resilience, among others, to get a larger share 
of attention after the crisis. 
Methodology 
We compared research output of top economics departments before and 
after the crisis using two methods: a keyword analysis and a questionnaire study. In 
what follows we discuss the type of research output we decided to consider, the 
choice of institutions included in the study, the choice of papers, and the two 
methods we used to measure the hypothesized change.  
Type of output 
Since the crisis occurred relatively recently and the processing time of 
economics journals is very long, we decided to focus on working papers. Working 
papers are highly regarded as an efficient and common way of exchanging ideas in 
the economics community. Journal articles have partially lost this function because 
of the slow reviewing procedures of economics journals. The shorter time gap 
between the inception of ideas and their public availability as working papers also 
enabled us to determine the time when ideas occurred more precisely, which was 
very important for the purpose of our study. We were not concerned about the 
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credibility of the working papers we analyzed, for at least two reasons. First, we 
considered only working papers produced at the leading economics departments, 
renowned for the quality of their work. Second, working papers are intended for 
publication in journals, and we did not expect the top economists to use one 
methodology for working papers and another for journal papers. However, a 
systematic difference in the methodology between the two could occur, given the 
possibility that papers using alternative methodologies, for instance, are harder to 
get published. This can happen as editorial boards of journals may reject papers with 
“inadequate” methodology, keeping them in the category of working papers longer 
or forcing them to be published elsewhere. While this is an interesting possibility, 
our goal was to assess if there was a change in ideas in the economist’s mind rather 
than if the field was ready to accept the change at the institutional level.  
Choice of institutions 
The literature provides a number of ratings of the academic economics 
institutions based on different ranking criteria (Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, & Stengos, 
2011; Kalaitzidakis, Stengos, & Mamuneas, 2003). We opted for the ranking of the 
Repec repository,37 which is based on aggregation of seven ranking methods38 used 
to rate economics institutions whose working papers make up their working-paper 
database. Since our goal was to consider academic papers, from the overall top 10 
institutions we discarded two nonacademic institutions, the World Bank Group and 
the International Monetary Fund. To avoid the problem of double counting papers, 
                                                     
 
37 Repec is an online repository of publications with the largest database of working papers in economics.  
38 A detailed description of the ranking methodology is available online on the Repec website 
(https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.inst.alldetail.html top/top.inst.alldetail.html).   
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we decided to disregard the papers of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
whose members are also members of other institutions included in the study. From 
the remaining seven institutions we ended up with five for which we were able to 
obtain reliable and comprehensive data. These institutions are the economics 
departments at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Oxford University, and 
Princeton University, and the Boot School of Business at University of Chicago and 
the London School of Economics.  
Choice of papers 
The study included papers that were posted online in the latest pre- and 
postcrisis years we could select, 2006 and 2013, respectively. To collect the papers 
we used online databases of the corresponding institutions whenever 
comprehensive data for 2006 and 2013 were available at their websites. If the data 
were not available or were incomplete we relied on online repositories such as 
Repec or Econbiz. In the end, we collected 353 papers, 167 from 2006 and 186 from 
2013. After compiling the data we applied two types of analysis to measure and 
compare indicators of analogy use: a questionnaire and a keyword study.  
Questionnaire study 
For the questionnaire study we asked authors to assess the use of different 
analogies in the methodology of their papers (see Appendix). For this purpose we 
designed questions asking about the use of different thematic positions that indicate 
specific analogical worldviews. Most of the methodological principles were 
represented by one question in the questionnaire (Table 2). We decided to omit a 
question regarding reversibility since the issue is quite technical and difficult to 
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define briefly with acceptable precision. Similarly, separate questions on the 
epistemological view and complexity are omitted and considered as a part of the 
question regarding the use of the complexity approach (Item 13, Table 2). Finally, we 
explicitly asked authors to assess to what extent they thought their analysis reflected 
the evolutionary and ecological approaches (Items 11–12, Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Overview of the methodological themata, keywords, and questions 
Methodological 
thema 
Keywords Question 
1. Reduction 
 
Marginal, preference, 
utility, expectation, 
aggregate, household, 
consumer, firm, country, 
good, commodity, 
representative 
Would you say that your paper 
reflects 
1) Strong reductionism 
2) Weak reductionism 
3) Holism 
4) None of the above 
2. Isolation Exogenous, endogenous, 
entropy, externality, 
monopoly, oligopoly 
How would you characterize 
analysis in your paper? 
1) Partial market analysis  
2) General market analysis 
3) Open system analysis Ib 
4) Open system analysis IIb 
5) None of the above 
3. Reversibility  Path dependence Since the nature of the issue is 
very technical we decided not to 
include this thema in the 
questionnaire and the keyword 
study. 
4. Dynamic 
tendency 
Equilibrium, supply, 
demand, price, 
maximization, 
optimization, far-from-
equilibrium, discontinuity, 
amplifications, feedback 
loops, tipping point 
In your paper, did you employ 
1) Equilibrium analysis  
2) Discontinuities and far-from-
equilibrium analysis  
3) Neither of the above  
5. Linearity Nonlinear, linear,  The model in your paper is 
1) Linear 
2) Nonlinear 
3) Neither of the above 
6. Determinism Probability, distribution, 
probabilistic, stochastic, 
noise, random, normal 
The model in your paper is 
1) Deterministic 
2) Stochastic 
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Methodological 
thema 
Keywords Question 
distribution, lognormal, 
power-law 
3) Neither of the above 
 
The analysis in your paper 
assumes (multiple options can 
be selected) 
1) Normal distribution 
2) Lognormal distribution 
3) Power-law distribution 
4) Some other distribution 
5) None of the above 
7. Complexity See Item 13. See Item 13. 
8. Epistemological 
view 
See Item 13. See Item 13. 
9. Behavioral 
model 
Bounded rationality Which of the following 
behavioral strategies are present 
in your paper (multiple options 
can be selected)? 
1) Maximization without 
constraints 
2) Maximization with constraints 
3) Nonmaximizing behavioral 
strategies 
4) None of the above 
10. Stability 
concept 
Stability, resilience, 
robustness, attractor 
Which of the following concepts 
of resilience is reflected in your 
paper? 
1) Engineering resilience 
2) Resilience in multi-equilibrium 
systems 
3) Resilience in complex 
adaptive systems 
4) None of the above or not 
relevant 
11. Evolutionary 
approach 
Evolution, dynamics, 
change, novelty, 
emergence, self-
organization 
How much does your paper 
reflect an evolutionary 
approach? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
12. Ecological 
approacha 
Adaptive, system, 
uncertainty, ecology, 
environment, complexity, 
hierarchy, network, 
How much does your paper 
reflect an ecological approach? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
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Methodological 
thema 
Keywords Question 
simulation, scenario, agent 3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
13. Complexity 
approach 
Adaptive, system, 
uncertainty, ecology, 
environment, complexity, 
hierarchy, network, 
simulation, scenario, agent 
How much does your paper 
reflect the ideas of complexity 
analysis? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
aWe decided to collapse the keywords for the complexity and ecological approaches 
because of their conceptual similarity. However, they appear as separate questions 
in the questionnaire. 
bSee Appendix for description. 
Note: In addition to 10 themata we asked 3 more questions Items 11, 12, and 13.  
 
As we aimed to assess not only if the principles were employed but also to 
what extent they were employed, we constructed scales representing different 
levels of use of the principles. Full descriptions of the concepts used to describe the 
scale levels are provided in the Appendix. The questionnaire was sent to authors of 
each selected paper. The advantage of relying on the authors’ self-reports is that our 
raters were well acquainted with the papers and were motivated to be included in 
the study. Out of 517 authors who received our email, 153 proceeded to the 
questions, and 97 of them completed the questionnaire fully.  Our results are based 
on the complete entries. 
Keyword study 
To test our hypothesis more rigorously we also conducted a keyword study. 
For this purpose, we made a list of keywords that implicitly indicate use of different 
methodological principles (Table 1). The frequency of keyword appearance served as 
an indicator of how much a particular principle was involved in the methodology of 
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the papers. The list of the keywords, in singular and plural form, was organized in 
subsets, each corresponding to the items (1–13) in Table 2. Due to the conceptual 
similarities between the ecological and complexity approaches (Items 12 and 13, 
Table 2), they are represented with the same keywords. Given that keywords could 
appear in forms other than nouns (e.g., the keyword “emergence” can appear as the 
adjective “emergent”), we decided to include all words for which the Levenshtein 
distance from the singular or plural form was equal to or greater than 0.9. The 
criterion was set conservatively to minimize false alarms, at the expense of some 
missed signal, that is, undetected keywords. The formula that we used to calculate 
the Levenshtein distance, lev𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏(|𝑎𝑎|, |𝑏𝑏|), between two strings 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 is given as 
lev𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ max (𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) if min(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 0,min� lev𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖 − 1, 𝑗𝑗) + 1lev𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 − 1) + 1lev𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏(𝑖𝑖 − 1, 𝑗𝑗 − 1) + 1�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖≠𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗� otherwise.  
Results 
First, we present observations from the questionnaire study and discuss changes in 
the use of each of the methodological principles from the pre- to the postcrisis 
period. Figure 339 shows that the use of “strong reductionism” was reduced, 
whereas “weak reductionism” and especially “holism” became more popular after 
the crisis. 
39 For clarity we decided to omit results for answers “none/neither of the above and inapplicable” in Figures 1–8. 
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In line with this result we also observed an increased use of “general market 
analysis” and “open system analysis I”40 at the expense of “partial market analysis” 
(Figure 4). While this indicates a tendency to situate economic phenomena within a 
broader economic environment, the drop in “open system analysis II”41 suggests that 
there was still reluctance to include social or ecological factors as a part of the 
analysis. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of isolation versus integration types of analysis in economic 
methodology based on reports of authors of working papers sampled from 2006 and 
2013. 
Figure 3. Proportion of reductionist vs. holistic types of analysis in economic 
methodology based on reports of authors of working papers sampled from 
2006 and 2013. 
40 Open system analysis I is defined as an analysis that is generalized to include interactions of a market space 
economy with economies from outside the target system (see Appendix). 
41 Open system analysis II is defined as an analysis that is further generalized to include interactions of an open 
economic system with ecological and/or social factors (see Appendix). 
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Figure 5 suggests no change when it comes to the use of the equilibrium 
analysis, which successfully preserved its dominant position in the methodological 
toolkit of mainstream economists. Regarding stability frameworks used for policy-
making recommendations, there were signs of change in favor of perceiving the 
economy as a complex adaptive system (Figure 6).  
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Figure 5. Proportion of equilibrium versus far-from-equilibrium 
analysis in economic methodology based on reports of authors of 
working papers sampled from 2006 and 2013. 
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Figure 7 illustrates that when modeling agents’ behavior in 2013, economists 
did not rely as much as before on maximizing decision strategies without constraints. 
Instead, nonmaximizing behavioral strategies, which were virtually absent from our 
sample before the crisis, had an important role afterward. 
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Figure 6. Proportion of different policy-making frameworks in economic 
methodology based on reports of authors of working papers sampled from 
2006 and 2013. 
Figure 7. Proportion of different behavioral strategies assumed for 
modeling of economic agents based on reports of authors of working 
papers sampled from 2006 and 2013. 
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Regarding more technical modeling assumptions, there was no negative 
trend in the use of linear models. In fact the opposite is true (Figure 8). However, the 
dominance of nonlinear models extended to the postcrisis period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher popularity of stochastic models compared to deterministic models 
before the crisis increased further over the 6-year period (Figure 9). Figure 10 shows 
that the normal distribution was the most commonly used distribution in economic 
modeling in both periods, and that lognormal and power-law distributions received 
slightly more attention in 2013.  
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Figure 8. Proportion of linear and nonlinear models in 
economic methodology based on reports of authors of 
working papers sampled from 2006 and 2013. 
Figure 9. Proportion of deterministic and stochastic models 
in economic methodology based on reports of authors of 
working papers sampled from 2006 and 2013. 
 70 
 
 
When authors were asked explicitly how much the methodology in their 
papers reflected use of evolutionary ideas, the percentage of authors who answered 
“very much” increased substantially (Figure 11). At the same time the proportion of 
papers that partially relied on evolutionary concepts showed the opposite trend. It 
may be that those who experimented with evolutionary ideas before the crisis were 
encouraged to further explore their use. The answers to the same question 
regarding complexity and ecological ideas did not indicate any change between the 
two periods. 
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Figure 10. Proportion of different types of distributions in economic models based on 
reports of authors of working papers sampled from 2006 and 2013. 
Figure 11. Proportion of different levels of involvement of the evolutionary framework 
in economic methodology based on reports of authors of working papers sampled from 
2006 and 2013. 
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Figures 12 displays the main results from the keyword study. Figure 12a 
suggests that almost all top-10 keywords associated with the highest relative change 
in percentage of papers with those keywords correspond to the life sciences 
worldview. The roughly doubled use of the keywords network, complexity, and 
discontinuity is particularly significant since their relative occurrence in the baseline 
year was at least 5% (Figure 12b).  
 
Figure 12. Top 10 keywords. Relative change from 2006 to 2013 in percentage of 
working papers containing keywords (a), and their relative occurrence in the papers 
in the baseline year 2006 (b). 
 
Discussion 
Economists are polarized about the state of their field. Some have argued that 
economics is still dominated by neoclassical thought (Earl, 2010; Weintraub, 2007), 
whereas others have suggested that a new era has already arrived (Holt et al., 2011). 
The conflicting camps have typically used different criteria: Members of the former 
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often point out that it is neoclassical theory that is taught in economics 
departments; the latter, in contrast, have focused on research and cite examples of 
papers with “heterodox” methodologies published in the mainstream journals 
authored by scholars affiliated with the top departments. While both arguments are 
relevant and perhaps correct, it is hard to expect that a significant discrepancy 
between syllabi and research is sustainable in the long run.  The change of syllabi 
clearly requires more time, but if a sufficient number of scholars conduct insightful 
research using “novel” methods, these studies will eventually find their way onto the 
syllabi. This is not to say that the pace of change in economic education is irrelevant, 
but the main hindrance in understanding whether there is a capacity for such change 
is lack of evidence about the state of economic research. This study was designed to 
systematically examine the research of top economic scholars to determine if the 
2007–2009 financial crisis facilitated a change in the field.  
Our thematic map contains 10 methodological presuppositions, which serve as 
dimensions in our metric system designed to determine change. This is comparable 
to Colander, Holt, and Rosser’s (2004) study, in which they defined change in terms 
of divergence from three methodological positions: rationality, selfishness, and 
equilibrium. Our results show that important aspects of economic methodology 
underwent noticeable change after the financial crisis. For instance, authors 
reported increased use of holistic-oriented approaches, a higher tendency toward 
more integrative ways of studying economic phenomena, increased popularity of 
heuristic-like behavioral models, increased use of ecological resilience as a policy-
making framework, as well as increased popularity of evolutionary and complexity 
ideas (Figures 3–11). The increased occurrence of the keywords networks, 
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complexity, and discontinuity point in the same direction (Figure 12). The use of 
equilibrium analysis, however, remained at the same level.  
We also demonstrated that the benefits of our analogical approach are 
numerous. First, we used it to provide a rich historical introduction to how the 
methodological foundations of economics were established. Second, it facilitated 
identification of distinctive methodological positions, which taken together form 
consistent methodological worldviews. Third, psychological insights about the 
underlying processes of scientific discovery made possible the integration of Holton’s 
thematic analysis and Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. The solid theoretical 
framework in turn provided a broader perspective on understanding change in the 
field and helped form expectations about the direction of change. 
Predicting a paradigm shift might be as hard as predicting a financial crisis. Our 
study demonstrated that signs of change are present, but whether and when they 
will lead to a paradigm shift it is difficult to tell. Also, it is not clear what the minimal 
criteria for a paradigm shift are. Perhaps the safest indication that new 
methodologies have gained wide acceptance is when they find their place in the 
economics curriculum. So far there is little evidence that this is the case.  
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Appendix 
In what follows, we provide a brief explanation of each of the methodological 
principles that we used to characterize economic analysis, followed by a question 
about how much these principles were reflected in the papers. 
Reductionism (Strong and Weak) Versus Holism 
In economics, reductionism entails explaining a “macro” phenomenon by analyzing 
the behavior of individual decision makers (agents), such as consumers, households, 
or firms. Macro phenomena are those that are generated from the collective actions 
of numerous individuals, such as market price, the unemployment rate, or the gross 
domestic product. 
Here, we differentiate between strong and weak reductionism. Strong 
reductionism requires that one of the following three criteria be satisfied: 
1) All agents in a model have a uniform behavioral strategy—for example, 
maximization of expected utility. In contrast, if a model includes agents 
with different behavioral strategies, for instance, if in addition to 
maximizers there are satisficers and/or imitators, then agents are said to 
have a heterogeneous behavioral strategy. Please note that if agents are 
maximizing their expected utility with different utility functions the model 
is still considered to have a uniform behavioral strategy. 
2) Interactions among agents are not the focus—aside from implicit 
interactions via market mechanisms, agents’ interactions are not part of 
the analysis. 
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3) The model is designed top down—this is a property of a model that has 
macro-level constraints. Assuming an economy is predisposed to achieve 
a settled state (equilibrium) is an example of a top-down design. 
Reductionism that does not possess any of these characteristics is weak 
reductionism.  
In contrast, holism is an alternative to reductionism. It assumes that macro 
consequences are not explained in terms of individual behavior. Hence, studying 
macro phenomena by focusing on properties of the whole system, without referring 
to individual behavior, can be characterized as a holistic approach. 
Would you say that your paper reflects 
1) Strong reductionism 
2) Weak reductionism 
3) Holism 
4) None of the above 
Isolation: Closed Versus Open System 
Isolation entails separating a phenomenon from its surroundings in order to keep 
factors that are irrelevant to a particular observation constant. For example, to study 
the relationship between the prices of two products, isolation would mean keeping 
the prices of other products that might influence that relationship constant. We 
distinguish between four levels of isolation in economic analysis, ranging from more 
closed (1) to more open (4): 
1) Partial market analysis—analysis is restricted to only a certain segment of 
a market space (region). Examples are analysis of labor markets or used 
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car markets in isolation from other sectors (or products, services, etc.) 
that naturally belong to the same market space. 
2) General market analysis—analysis aims at an integrative study of a 
market space economy (which is often hypothetical), in which market 
segments communicate between each other. 
3) Open system analysis I—analysis is generalized to include interactions of a 
market space economy with economies from outside of the target 
system. 
4) Open system analysis II—analysis is further generalized to include 
interactions of an open economic system with ecological and/or social 
factors. 
How would you characterize analysis in your paper? 
1) Partial market analysis  
2) General market analysis 
3) Open system analysis I 
4) Open system analysis II 
5) None of the above 
Equilibrium Versus Discontinuities and Far-From-Equilibrium Behavior 
Economic equilibrium relies on the assumption that individual market actions 
balance demand and supply and lead to a stable allocation of goods and services on 
the market. In contrast, analyses of dynamic discontinuities in an economic system 
are focused on forces that disturb system stability (initiate and facilitate change), for 
instance, innovations and technological progress, on the one hand, and cheap credit 
expansions, market bubbles, and collapses of financial markets on the other.   
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In your paper, did you employ 
1) Equilibrium analysis  
2) Discontinuities and far-from-equilibrium analysis  
3) Neither of the above 
Full Versus Bounded Rationality 
A fully rational agent is a utility maximizer, able to gather all possible bits of 
information and integrate them to make optimal decisions. There are two branches 
of bounded rationality modeling. One branch accepts some agent limitations but 
essentially preserves maximizing behavior given the acknowledged constraints. 
Another branch sees limitations as the natural environment of decision makers who, 
instead of maximizing behavior, have developed adaptive strategies (heuristics) that 
correspond to given conditions. 
Which of the following behavioral strategies are present in your paper 
(multiple options can be selected)? 
1) Maximization without constraints 
2) Maximization with constraints 
3) Nonmaximizing behavioral strategies 
4) None of the above 
Resilience 
Resilience is the stability concept that describes properties of the system state from 
the perspective of its ability to sustain potential future disturbances. Here, we 
recognize three different resilience concepts: engineering (single-equilibrium) 
resilience, resilience in multi-equilibrium systems, and resilience in complex adaptive 
systems. The concept of engineering resilience recognizes that there is one desired 
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stability state, and once this is disturbed, typically due to external shocks, the policy 
intervention goal is to regain the same stability again. The second resilience concept 
assumes that the system behavior allows for multiple stability states, and that policy 
recommendations will aim to guide a distressed system through changes in old 
structures and system organization that lead to new stability states. The last concept 
treats resilience as a process. Complex adaptive systems tend to exhibit a cyclic 
behavior with phases characterized by different structural properties and resilience 
levels. Policy recommendations that offer adaptive guidance of the system through 
different periods of the cycle imply that this concept is being followed. 
Which of the following concepts of resilience is reflected in your paper? 
1) Engineering resilience 
2) Resilience in multi-equilibrium systems 
3) Resilience in complex adaptive systems 
4) None of the above, or not relevant 
Short- Versus Long-Term Horizon 
A time horizon of an analysis is considered long if it is longer than 10 years and short 
if it is any other duration. Additionally, if the time horizon is not explicitly discussed 
such an analysis is assumed to be timeless. For instance, equilibrium analysis has 
implicitly a long-term horizon, but given that the time is entirely unspecified, it will 
be considered as a timeless analysis.  
The analysis in your paper has or is 
1) A short-term horizon 
2) A long-term horizon 
3) Timeless 
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4) None of the above 
Linear Versus Nonlinear Model 
A linear model assumes relationships between variables in the form of a linear 
function, a polynomial function of degree zero, or one. In contrast, a nonlinear 
model is one in which dependencies between variables are not expressed as a linear 
combination. The most common examples are inverse, quadric, exponential, and 
logarithmic functions. 
The model in your paper is 
1) Linear 
2) Nonlinear 
3) Neither of the above 
Deterministic Versus Stochastic Model 
A deterministic model is one in which the value of a dependent variable is uniquely 
determined by given values of independent variables and parameters. For the same 
initial conditions (a set of independent variables and parameters), output of a 
deterministic model is always the same. This is not the case with stochastic models, 
whose functional form contains at least one random term whose value is not fully 
predetermined by initial conditions.   
The model in your paper is 
1) Deterministic 
2) Stochastic 
3) Neither of the above 
Normal, Lognormal, and Power-Law Distributions 
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Statistical analyses often assume a particular distribution underlying the data, such 
as normal distribution.  
The analysis in your paper assumes (multiple options can be selected) 
1) Normal distribution 
2) Lognormal distribution 
3) Power-law distribution 
4) Some other distribution 
5) None of the above 
Complexity 
Any analysis that considers some of the common complex adaptive system 
descriptors, such as nonlinear dynamics, irreversibility, feedback loops, emergence, 
self-organization, hierarchical (modular) system organization, path dependence, 
adaptiveness (adaptive systems), and uncertainty can be considered a complex 
system analysis. 
How much does your paper reflect the ideas of complexity analysis? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
Evolutionary Approach 
Here, at the center of interest are the evolutionary processes of structural and 
organizational properties of firms, industries, and economies. Regularities in these 
processes are studied in the same way that processes of natural selection are 
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studied in biology, explaining why certain features prevail in the population 
(economy) and others die out. Innovation, technological progress, entrepreneurship, 
and creativity are typically recognized as main drivers of change and hence often 
studied in this context.  
How much does your paper reflect an evolutionary approach? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
Ecological Approach 
Apart from economic factors, this analysis usually includes environmental and social 
components that might have important economic consequences. The ecological 
analysis is an open system analysis, as it considers interactions of the studied market 
space with its surrounding markets. 
How much does your paper reflect an ecological approach? 
1) Not at all 
2) A little 
3) Quite a lot 
4) Very much 
5) Inapplicable 
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3. Contagion in Banking Networks: The Role of Uncertainty*
Abstract. We study the role of information and confidence in the spread of financial 
shocks through interbank markets. Confidence in financial institutions has only 
recently been introduced in computational models studying the stability of financial 
networks (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012). However, so far it has been assumed that all 
agents have complete information about the system. Here we add realism to a 
model of interbank markets by introducing uncertainty into what banks know about 
other banks. In our model, information spreads through the lending network and the 
quality of information depends on the proximity of the information source. Instead 
of having complete information, banks receive information that is delayed, noisy, or 
local. This affects their confidence and the resulting lending decisions. We show that 
introducing uncertainty leads to a substantial increase in the probability of whole-
system collapse after an idiosyncratic bank failure. In contrast, when the same shock 
is distributed among multiple smaller banks, uncertainty mitigates the impact of the 
shock. The consequences of a large bank’s failure are the most difficult to predict. 
Our study demonstrates the need for a better understanding of the role of 
information asymmetries in systemic risk in financial networks. 
*
I collaborated on a version of this chapter together with Mirta Galesic, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos, Amit
Kothiyal, and Nimalan Arinaminpathy.
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Introduction 
Financial crises are a product of a contagion process. A shock affecting one part of 
the financial system can spread and reach parts of the system that were not initially 
affected. In certain conditions, financial difficulties can spread over a large portion of the 
system, causing prolonged states of distress and low performance. The severity and global 
character of the 2007–2008 financial crisis demonstrated that modern financial markets are 
becoming increasingly interconnected and concentrated, two structural changes favoring 
the chance of far-reaching contagion.  
Network approaches offer a useful framework for understanding the dynamics of 
contagion processes in biological, social, and financial systems (Brockmann & Helbing, 2013; 
Chmiel, Klimek, & Thurner, 2014; Elliott, Golub, & Jackson, 2014; Gai et al., 2011). By 
constructing and examining the topology of interdependencies between agents in a system, 
this approach can be used to model a number of important factors influencing the dynamics 
of contagion, such as structural properties of the system, properties of agents in the system, 
triggers of the distress, and contagion mechanisms. In financial systems in particular, 
individual institutions are linked to each other through a complex system of interbank 
lending (Minoiu & Reyes, 2013) and holdings in common assets (Caccioli, Shrestha, Moore, 
& Farmer, 2014). Such a system lends itself naturally to being modeled through a network 
approach.  
There are different mechanisms by which contagion could spread in such a system: 
for example, counter-party default is a mechanism that spreads financial problems between 
financial agents with a credit relationship (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, & Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015). 
Liquidity hoarding, where institutions withhold funding from one another (which led to the 
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global “credit squeeze” of 2008), is another form of contagion (Gai & Kapadia, 2010). The 
system structure determines potential pathways for contagion. For instance, the core–
periphery structure of the global banking network makes it easier for financial shocks to 
reach any part of the system through the well-connected core (Minoiu & Reyes, 2013). In 
addition to the links between agents, the characteristics of individual agents—such as their 
risk portfolios—also shape the spread of contagion. All these factors together create a 
context in which a triggering event, such as failure of a large bank (e.g., Lehman Brothers) or 
a drop in price of an asset commonly held by many financial agents, initially affects the 
system. Therefore, a network approach can also help identify events that can be particularly 
distressing for the system and even anticipate their possible occurrence. 
While many models of financial networks treat contagion as being directly 
transmitted between institutions, it is also widely appreciated that psychological effects, 
such as market panics, also play a critical role in financial crises (Kelly & Ó Gráda, 2000). 
Previous work by Arinaminpathy, Kapadia, and May (2012; the AKM model) combined such 
“confidence effects” with network models in a simple way, presenting a framework where 
system distress affected how individual institutions responded to their counterparties, and 
vice versa. For simplicity, this work assumed that institutions have perfect information 
about the rest of the system (including information about other agents’ capital, loans, 
deposits, and liquid assets).  
In reality, however, uncertainty can play a powerful role in confidence effects. In 
particular, reporting is not done in real time, the reports are not always fully reliable (e.g., as 
in the case of Lehman Brothers), all relevant indicators are not included in the reports, and 
informal channels of communication facilitate further information asymmetries. All of these 
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factors contribute to the uncertainty of banks’ information about the system, and their 
effects are amplified in times of crisis when changes happen very rapidly.  
In the work presented here, we adapted the AKM model to address these issues: we 
manipulated the distribution of information in a financial system and studied how it 
influenced banks’ decisions. In particular, we modeled information asymmetries as a 
function of topological distance between information source and information user. When 
distance increases, information becomes unavailable, delayed, or noisy. We examined the 
dynamics of the system under each of these conditions.  
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Confidence, Information, and Financial Contagion 
Confidence in Banking Systems 
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 is widely recognized as having been a crisis of 
confidence in financial institutions (Tonkiss, 2009; Uslaner, 2010). A functioning banking 
network, in which banks borrow and lend money to each other efficiently, is essential for 
ensuring a liquid banking system and sufficient money supply in the economy. To be 
efficient and competitive, banks need to invest most of the depositors’ funds as lucrative 
long-term investments and keep only a small fraction as low-profit liquid assets for servicing 
urgent needs. The stability of this fractional reserve scheme relies heavily on financial 
participants being confident that deposits will not be withdrawn within a short time and 
that a sufficient amount of liquid assets can be found at the interbank market if needed.  
While this highly efficient system is tolerant of independent actions of agents, 
synchronized behavior has the potential to destabilize the entire system. For instance, 
erosion of confidence can lead to collective withdrawals of liquid assets, causing liquidity 
issues in the financial system that can rapidly spread to the rest of the economy. The 
potential of confidence to guide collective action is closely related to the dynamics of 
information in the system. For example, financial agents in different parts of the system 
have access to different information, leading to an uneven distribution of confidence in the 
network. Yet, the effect of heterogeneously distributed confidence has been left unexplored 
due to the assumption of complete information (CI). 
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CI and uncertainty 
The AKM model adopts the CI assumption; that is, it presupposes that agents 
deterministically and instantly know the exact state of all other agents in the system. In 
contrast, we modeled information asymmetries that result from information channels being 
determined by the underlying network of interactions. As a result, banks have partial or 
imprecise information about other banks in the system. 
The assumption that agents have complete information about their economic 
environment is one of the most prevalent and long-standing assumptions in economic 
modeling. The CI assumption is typically part of the rational actor model, which additionally 
assumes rationality of agents. The rational actor is therefore capable of (1) collecting all 
relevant information (CI assumption) and (2) integrating the collected information and 
foreseeing all possible states of the world that it implies (rationality). However, real-world 
economic systems are extremely complex, difficult to measure, and difficult to predict. As 
Knight (1921) pointed out, much of economic interaction is characterized by deep 
uncertainty that is hard or impossible to quantify. Therefore, while the rational actor model 
is applicable to the world of risk, in which potential outcomes and corresponding 
probabilities are fully known, this is no longer case in the world of Knightian uncertainty 
(Aikman et al., 2014; Meder, Le Lec, & Osman, 2013). 
 
Model Overview 
 
Our analysis focuses on a short time horizon, during which the network changes due 
to the immediate agent’s reactions and not due to that agent’s strategic decisions. The AKM 
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model is an agent-based simulation developed in the ecological tradition42 to explore the 
relationship between the structure and the stability of the system (Farmer, 2002; Haldane & 
May, 2011; May et al., 2008). Agents in the model are banks that are connected by 
borrowing and lending relationships established at the interbank market. Confidence of 
agents is modeled as a function of assets and interbank loans remaining in the system. (The 
lower the level of assets and loans in the system, the lower the confidence of banks.) 
Decrease in confidence leads to more “defensive” behavior among banks, manifested as 
shortening of lending maturities or cutting lending altogether (liquidity hoarding). This, in 
turn, can spread problems to other banks, causing bank failures and a further decrease in 
confidence. In other words, the model aims to capture dynamic feedback between the 
macro and micro levels of the system, that is, between the condition of the system 
(reflected in confidence) and an individual bank’s behavior.  
In addition to liquidity hoarding, there are two other contagion mechanisms 
captured by the model. One relates to the propagation of counterparty credit risk, which 
can lead to the lender’s default if the borrower is not able to repay the loan. The other is 
asset price contagion, which takes place when liquidation of assets of failing banks pushes 
the corresponding asset prices down. All banks that have the same problematic assets in 
their portfolio will suffer from the price shock (the model does not include correlation 
between assets).  
42
 In the ecological view, advocated by, among others, Robert May, Andy Haldane, and Doyne Farmer, the complexity of 
financial markets, which are commonly compared to ecosystems, cannot be captured by looking at their isolated parts but 
only by putting them together in a more holistic approach. From the ecological perspective, markets are inherently 
dynamic, and far-from-equilibrium models are much more suitable to describe them than conventional equilibrium 
models.  
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Nodes and edges 
 Nodes or banks in the network can be large or small, the size ratio fixed by the size 
coefficient 𝑞𝑞 (𝑞𝑞 = 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎; the 
default value of 𝑞𝑞 in our model is 10). 
Banks are represented as simplified 
balance sheets (Figure 13). The liability 
side contains capital, retail deposits, and 
interbank borrowing. The capital level 
measures how much stress on the asset 
side a bank can withstand before 
suffering from a capital default and 
becoming insolvent. Retail deposits are 
taken to be external to the system and do not play an active role in the model. Interbank 
borrowing represents the amount of incoming loans from other banks and the number of 
incoming loans represents the in-degree of an individual node. On the asset side there are 𝑛𝑛 
external asset classes, liquid assets, and interbank lending. External asset classes are 
distributed among banks from a fixed number 𝐺𝐺 of distinct asset classes contained in the 
system. Liquid assets are a small fraction 𝑙𝑙 of the overall assets that banks keep in the most 
liquid form to meet immediate needs. They are mostly composed of cash or any cash 
equivalent, such as central bank reserves or high-quality government bonds, which are 
easily convertible to money. Finally, interbank lending corresponds to outgoing loans to 
other banks in the system, thus giving rise to a lending network, as described below. 
Figure 13. A balance sheet representation of a 
bank (adapted from Arinaminpathy et al., 
2012). 𝑎𝑎 = total assets; 𝛾𝛾 = capital ratio; 𝑙𝑙 = 
liquidity ratio; 𝜃𝜃 = interbank loans-to-assets 
ratio; 𝑧𝑧 = average number of incoming and 
outgoing loans. 
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Parameters 𝛾𝛾 and 𝜃𝜃 (Figure 13) determine the initial proportions of capital and interbank 
loans in the total assets 𝑎𝑎, respectively. 
Network 
The network is a directed random graph with 𝑁𝑁 banks. The in-degree and out-degree 
of banks are determined by a Poisson distribution with parameter 𝑧𝑧 for small banks and 
𝑞𝑞 × 𝑧𝑧 for large banks. Each edge in the network is a loan with direction from lender to 
borrower. A random half of interbank lending is assigned to be “short-term” and the rest is 
“long-term” lending. The banks are also interrelated by sharing the same external asset 
classes. These relationships are the basis for the asset price contagion.  
The difference in the connectivity of large and small banks and random assignment 
of their relationships result in the core–periphery structure of the network. That is, large 
banks with many links are densely interconnected—forming the core, and small banks with 
few links are loosely interconnected—forming the periphery. The resulting structure is 
“shallow,” 43 meaning that the average path length in the network is relatively short due to 
the well-connected core.  
Confidence and individual health 
Confidence 𝐶𝐶 is the first important determinant of a bank’s behavior. In the AKM 
model confidence is calculated as a function of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸, which are measures of solvency 
and liquidity of the system, respectively:   
                                                     
 
43
 We think that making the network “deeper” would be a valuable exercise. However, the tendency is that the global 
banking network is getting shallower. It is easier to understand this by envisioning the core–periphery structure of the 
global banking network. Roughly speaking, because of the high connectivity of the core, any bank at the periphery is either 
directly connected or one link away from the core, while almost all banks in the core are interconnected. 
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𝐶𝐶 = 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 
𝐴𝐴 = �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
,     𝐸𝐸 = �𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ,       𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖0𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1  
 
At a given point in time, 𝐴𝐴 denotes the total value of all remaining assets in the system as a 
proportion of its initial value; 𝐸𝐸 is similarly the fraction of interbank loans not withdrawn 
from the system; 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 are the remaining assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖 as the 
proportion of initial value of total assets in the system; 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are the absolute values of 
remaining assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖; and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
0 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖0 are the initial absolute values 
of assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖. 
To calculate 𝐶𝐶 as defined in the AKM model, and to take any action, banks have to 
know the current and initial values of assets and interbank loans of all banks in the system. 
To explore how the network behaves in a more realistic setting, especially in times of crisis 
when the system is changing rapidly, we consider several uncertainty scenarios, described in 
the following section. 
 
Unlike 𝐶𝐶, which is a systemic parameter, ℎ𝑖𝑖  denotes the individual health of bank 𝑖𝑖 
and is calculated as a function of its indicators of solvency 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and liquidity 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 ,      0 < ℎ𝑖𝑖 < 1 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = min�1, �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖ST + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖� 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ST� � 
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where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the capital of bank 𝑖𝑖 defined as a proportion of its initial value; 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the fraction 
of 𝑖𝑖’s short-term liabilities that the bank can settle immediately, through its liquid and short-
term assets; 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
ST is the total value of 𝑖𝑖’s short-term interbank assets; 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
ST is the total value of 
𝑖𝑖’s short-term interbank liabilities; and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 is the amount of liquid assets held by bank 𝑖𝑖. 
Decision rules 
There are two possible actions that banks can take in discrete simulation time: 
shorten long-term interbank loans, and withdraw short interbank loans. Only withdrawing 
short-term loans can be done in a single time step; shortening long-term loans requires an 
additional time step. A loan between two banks 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 is, respectively, shortened and 
withdrawn when 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑗𝑗 < (1 − 𝐶𝐶)                                  (1) 
ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑗𝑗 < (1 − 𝐶𝐶)2                                 (2) 
 
If 𝐶𝐶 is high (1 or close to 1) these conditions are only satisfied under extreme conditions for 
ℎ𝑖𝑖, ℎ𝑗𝑗 . In contrast, a drop in 𝐶𝐶 can cause liquidity hoarding, as this affects the decision 
conditions of all banks. In addition, the shortening condition is easier to satisfy than the 
withdrawing condition, which means that banks resort to withdrawal only in relatively 
urgent situations. 
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Modeling Uncertainty 
 
We consider three uncertainty scenarios: local information (LI), delayed information 
(DI), and noisy information (NI).  As described in the section presenting model details, the 
AKM model essentially assumes a CI scenario.  
To model uncertainty and determine the amount of information that is included in 
the calculation of confidence 𝐶𝐶, we rely on the distance between nodes in the network. The 
distance 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) is the shortest path length between information user 𝑖𝑖 and information 
source 𝑗𝑗. If banks are directly connected, the distance between them is 1. It is also common 
to say that such nodes are neighbors. The distance between neighbors of neighbors is 2, and 
so forth. The main principle for modeling uncertainty is that information availability and/or 
quality deteriorates when the distance from the information source is increased. Once 
uncertainty is introduced, instead of one common estimate of confidence for all banks 
(∀𝑖𝑖: 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶 in the AKM model), each bank has its own individual perception of confidence 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖. 
We use the following notation template of any model parameter 𝑃𝑃: 
𝑃𝑃observed (optional)time step (optional);observer. For example, 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗0𝑖𝑖  denotes bank 𝑖𝑖’s judgment of 𝑗𝑗’s initial (0 time 
step) absolute value of assets. Absence of the time step indicator implies the current value 
of a parameter. The indicator of an observed bank is omitted when a parameter contains no 
information that relates only to an individual bank, such as 𝐶𝐶. 
In the LI scenario, information is available only up to a certain “interbank” distance. 
That is, bank 𝑖𝑖 calculates 𝐶𝐶 based on the information about itself and all banks placed within 
the fixed value of distance  𝑑𝑑max. For instance, if 𝑑𝑑max = 1, then only 𝑖𝑖 and its immediate 
neighbors contribute information to 𝐶𝐶. More generally, a bank’s confidence is calculated as 
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𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖  
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max)
𝑎𝑎0𝑖𝑖
 ,       𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max)
𝑒𝑒0𝑖𝑖
𝑎𝑎0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0 + � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗0𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max) ,          𝑒𝑒0𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖0 + � 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗0𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max)  
A set 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max) contains all banks that 𝑖𝑖 considers for estimation of 𝐶𝐶, except for 𝑖𝑖 itself, and 
is a function of 𝑑𝑑max. It is useful to think of 𝑑𝑑max as a parameter that determines the reach 
of 𝑖𝑖’s perception. To define 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max), we first define the set 𝐽𝐽 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁,  which contains 
all banks in the network. Then, its subset 𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max) is defined as 
𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖(𝑑𝑑max) = { 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽 ∣  𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ≤ 𝑑𝑑max  &  𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖} 
We consider two versions of the LI scenario: LI1 in which 𝑑𝑑max = 1 and LI2 in which 
𝑑𝑑max = 2. Since the network is quite shallow (average path length is barely above 2), the 
latter already contains almost the full graph, and LI3 is equal to CI. 
Unlike in the LI scenarios, in the DI scenarios banks receive information from all 
other banks in the system (𝑑𝑑max is not exogenously set), but some of the information is 
outdated. We model information delay as a function of distance—the further the 
information source the longer the delay. Since 𝑑𝑑max is determined endogenously by the 
network structure, it typically takes values not higher than 3 (this is again related to the 
shallowness of the network). If 𝑘𝑘 denotes the time step when information originated, 𝑡𝑡 the 
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time step in which it is received, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 the distance at which delay starts, and 𝑠𝑠 the size of 
applied delay, then 
 
𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗, 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑏𝑏𝑗𝑗 
 
  𝑘𝑘 = � 𝑡𝑡                          𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 < 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎max(0, 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠)  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 , 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) ∈ {1,2, … ,𝑑𝑑max},    𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ {1,2} 
  
We designed four variants of the DI scenario by manipulating 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 (Table 3). For 
instance, in the DI1 and DI3 scenarios the size of the delay is 1 time step (𝑠𝑠 = 1), and in the 
DI2 and DI4 it is 2 time steps (𝑠𝑠 = 2). In the DI1 and DI2 scenarios delay starts from 
neighbors of neighbors (𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = 2), whereas in the DI3 and DI4 scenarios it starts immediately 
from neighbors (𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 = 1). We set the minimum value of 𝑘𝑘 to 0 since negative values of time 
do not make sense in this context.  
Table 3. Delay scenarios according to the size of delay (in time steps) assigned to different 
levels of distance. 
Scenario 
Size of delay (t − k) 
0 (no delay) 1 2 
DI1 𝑖𝑖 + neighbors All other banks  
DI2 𝑖𝑖 + neighbors  All other banks 
DI3 𝑖𝑖 All other banks  
DI4 𝑖𝑖  All other banks 
Note. DI = Delayed information; 𝑖𝑖 = information user; 𝑘𝑘 = the time step when information 
originated; 𝑡𝑡 = the time step in which information is received. 
 
In the NI scenario, noise in information increases with distance. If ε denotes a 
random error with normal distribution ε~𝑁𝑁(0,σ2), 𝑣𝑣 the size of variance in the noise term, 
and 𝑑𝑑max maximal distance in the network, then 
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𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑ε, 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 1,2, … ,𝑑𝑑max, 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗; 
𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑ε, 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗) = 1,2, … ,𝑑𝑑max, 𝜎𝜎2 = 𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗; 
 
Two variants of the NI scenario are considered: NI5 and NI30. In the former, 𝑣𝑣 =  5% and in 
the latter, 𝑣𝑣 = 30%.  
 
Modeling Shocks and Bank Failures 
 
Under each of the conditions described above, we simulated the response of the 
system to an initial shock. We explored two types of initial shock: (i) a concentrated shock 
(or idiosyncratic shock as in AKM), randomly selecting a large or a small bank and forcing it 
to fail by setting its capital to zero, and (ii) a distributed shock, applied by forcing multiple 
small banks to fail simultaneously. In particular, a shock of 𝑞𝑞 small banks is equivalent in 
terms of assets to a large-bank shock. The comparison can be informative in terms of how 
the system responds if the same shock is concentrated in a single bank or distributed among 
multiple banks.  
A bank can go bankrupt for both liquidity and solvency reasons. A bank 𝑖𝑖 is illiquid if 
it cannot meet the demand of other banks to repay the loans with its liquid assets and 
short-term interbank loans �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
ST + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖�. A bank 𝑖𝑖 is insolvent once the asset devaluation 
(from an external asset price decrease or counterparty default, for instance) exceeds its 
level of capital 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖.  
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Simulation 
 
If one thinks of the simulation as a set of computational experiments, each replication is one 
experiment that has two phases. The first phase is to form the network and apply the 
initiating shock. The second phase is to simulate the propagation of this shock through the 
network, over several time steps.  
Network formation and application of shock 
To design a network with in- and out-degree drawn from a Poisson distribution as 
defined in the AKM model, the procedure requires the random draw to be repeated until 
the sum of all in-degrees is equal to the sum of corresponding out-degrees (which is a 
consistency requirement as each edge implies one in- and one out-degree). As a result, 
draws with nonmatching degrees have to be discarded and degree distributions of 
successfully acquired networks are effectively generated from a Poisson distribution subset 
that is not precisely defined. Instead, in the present study we first drew out-degrees from a 
Poisson distribution and then we used the degree distribution of this draw as weights for 
conducting weighted random sampling of corresponding in-degrees. This procedure 
preserves the results of the original AKM model, but has two advantages. First, an analytical 
analysis of the simulation processes and their outcomes is possible at least in principle, as 
in- and out-degree distributions of the network are known. Second, it is computationally 
less expensive, as each network draw is successful. In addition, we used a zero-truncated 
version of a Poisson distribution that ensured positive values of outgoing interbank loans 
and provided more balanced initial liquidity of banks. The probability mass function of the 
zero-truncated Poisson distribution was 
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𝑖𝑖(𝑘𝑘; 𝑧𝑧) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋 = 𝑘𝑘 | 𝑘𝑘 > 0) = 𝑧𝑧𝑏𝑏(𝑒𝑒𝑧𝑧 − 1)𝑘𝑘! 
 
Once in- and out-degrees were determined it was possible to reconstruct the rest of the 
bank’s balance sheets based on the parameters of the model. 
 
After the network was formed, a shock was applied. The shock hit one or several 
randomly chosen banks, depending on the type of shock to be applied. The shock was 
applied in time step 0, before the start of the second phase. 
Iteration of actions over time steps 
 
In this phase, five actions were performed in each time step: 
 
1) Recalculate health ℎ𝑖𝑖  of all banks. The health is used for stipulating liquidation of 
banks. Zero health implies that a bank needs to be liquidated. 
2) Liquidate banks that failed in the previous time step (or those failed because of the 
initial shock). If bank 𝑖𝑖 is to be liquidated then the procedure is as follows: 
a) Withdraw all short-term loans 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
ST that can be collected from the borrowers 
of 𝑖𝑖. Triggering the collection procedure means that 𝑖𝑖’s borrowers will ask 
their own borrowers for money, and so forth. Record banks that 
consequently satisfy the condition of illiquidity and are supposed to be 
liquidated in the next time step. 
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b) Settle all short-term borrowings 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
ST of 𝑖𝑖 that can be paid from its initial liquid
assets 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 and collected short-term loans 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
ST. Record the resulting shortage or
surplus.
c) Calculate the total long-term assets of 𝑖𝑖 by adding long-term loans to the
capital 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖. To this sum add the result from substep b. If there is a shortage of
assets when the sum is compared to long-term liabilities of 𝑖𝑖, then 𝑖𝑖’s long-
term lenders suffer from this amount of shock 𝑢𝑢 applied to their capital. The
shock is evenly distributed among the lenders, but only up to the level of
individual exposures. This ensures that the shock cannot exceed the level of
individual lending amount.
d) Sell external assets of 𝑖𝑖, applying the shock to all holders of the same asset
classes that 𝑖𝑖 had in its portfolio. The external assets are sold at a market that
is taken to be external to the model. The price of asset 𝑤𝑤 is assumed to be
decreasing to a fraction exp (−α𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤) of its initial value (modeled as in AKM),
in which 𝑥𝑥𝑤𝑤 is a proportion of the asset 𝑤𝑤 that is sold by 𝑖𝑖, and α is an
indicator of market liquidity that is directly related to confidence 𝐶𝐶,
α = 1 − 𝐶𝐶. If any bank suffers from the capital default based on the shocks
from substeps c and d, its health once it is recalculated will be 0. This
automatically qualifies such banks for liquidation in the next time step.
3) Apply decision rule 2 and withdraw short-term loans if condition is satisfied. It is
assumed that loans are perfectly divisible and partial withdrawals are possible. Then,
record all banks that become illiquid during the withdrawal in order to be liquidated
in the next time step. Note that the second decision rule is applied first as otherwise
it would be possible to withdraw long-term loans in a single time step.
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4) Apply decision rule 1 and administer shortening of long-term loans if the condition is 
satisfied.  
5) Recalculate the network and other parameters and go back to step 1 for the next 
time step.   
 
Model Parameters 
 
The number of banks in the network is 𝑁𝑁 = 120. The default value of the size 
coefficient 𝑞𝑞 is 10, which given other parameters of the model results in a system with 
𝑁𝑁b = 11 large and 𝑁𝑁s = 109 small banks. For the mean degree, 𝑧𝑧 = 5. That is, small banks 
on average have five incoming and five outgoing loans (edges), while for large banks the 
average number of loans is 50 (𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝑧𝑧). The default value of each single loan is normalized as 
1. Small banks have 10, and large banks 20 external asset classes (𝑛𝑛s = 10,𝑛𝑛b = 20). Given 
that on average 10 banks share the same asset class (𝑔𝑔 = 10), this implies 131 distinctive 
external asset classes (𝐺𝐺 = (𝑁𝑁b𝑛𝑛b + 𝑁𝑁s𝑛𝑛s)/𝑔𝑔). 
The balance sheet’s parameters reflect the values observed in the banking sector 
before the crisis (Bank of England, 2011): the proportion of total assets initially determined 
to be held in interbank loans θ = 0.2; the proportion of total assets initially liquid 𝑙𝑙 = 0.01; 
and capital to asset ratio γ = 0.04. 
 
Results 
The results are based on 1,000 simulation replications per scenario, with 
each replication lasting until the system came to rest. Figure 14 demonstrates that 
the main pattern of results from the AKM model was replicated. The figure depicts 
the frequency distribution for the total number of banks failing after a shock is 
applied to a single small (Figure 14a) or a single large (Figure 14b) bank. In the case 
of a large bank’s shock, the fat tail of the distribution indicates that the entire system 
collapses with a probability of nearly 20%. 
When uncertainty is introduced, the highest impact on the probability 
distributions of number of failed banks is realized in the LI1 scenario. Figure 15 
shows that the probability of whole-system failure after a shock to a single large 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of banks failed
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Number of banks failed
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
 b) Big bank shocka) Small-bank shock b) Large-bank shock 
Nu ber of failed banks Nu ber of failed banks 
Figure 14. Probability distributions of number of failed banks in a complete 
information scenario after (a) a shock applied to a small bank and (b) a shock applied 
to a large bank. 
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bank is now more than 90%.  Even after a shock to a small bank there is a nontrivial 
probability that the entire system fails.44 
Figure 16 displays a comparison of probabilities of whole-system failure 
across different uncertainty scenarios after a centralized (single bank) and a 
distributed (multiple banks) shock. The probabilities are consistently higher in the 
distributed than in the single shock treatment, except for in the LI1 scenario. In fact, 
the LI1 scenario, which is associated with the largest probability of system collapse in 
the case of a large bank’s shock, is at the same time associated with the smallest 
probability of system collapse in the distributed shock condition.  
44
 In high-resolution data of 10,000 repetitions, the probability of an entire system failing after a small-bank 
shock increases from 0% in the CK scenario to 0.16% in the LI1 scenario. This is not visible in Figure 15 but is 
shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 15. Probability distributions of number of banks failing in the LI1 scenario 
after (a) a small-bank shock and (b) a large-bank shock. LI1 is a scenario in 
which a bank has access only to information from its direct neighbors at 
distance 1. LI = local information. 
40 60 80 100 40 60 80 100
104 
Figure 16. Probability of whole-system failure across different uncertainty scenarios. 
The superimposed graph is an enlarged representation of the respective 
probabilities after a small bank’s shock. CI = Complete information; LI = local 
information; NI = noisy information; DI = delayed information. Local 1 and Local 2 = 
scenarios in which a bank has access only to information at distance 1 and 2, 
respectively. Noisy 5% and Noisy 30% = scenarios in which noise parameter 𝑣𝑣 is 5% 
and 30%, respectively. The delay scenarios are defined in Table 3. 
The NI scenarios (regardless of the size of noise) yield similar results to those 
of the CI scenario. In the case of the DI scenarios, the probabilities of whole-system 
failure increase with delay. This is even more obvious in the condition with a small-
bank shock (see superimposed graph in Figure 16).  
In the following section we mainly focus on explaining the most prominent 
results by comparing the CI and LI1 scenarios. Given that the other uncertainty 
scenarios (NI and DI) did not produce important difference in results when compared 
to the CI scenario, we discuss those results very briefly. 
Explaining the Results 
If the scenarios were mapped onto a diagram showing how much information 
agents have about others in the system, then the LI1 scenario would be at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the CI scenario. Other scenarios would fall close 
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to CI, as only LI scenarios restrict information availability. The results of the LI1 
scenario are particularly striking as they show that a limited information flow further 
intensifies the contagion dynamics observed in the AKM model after a large-bank 
failure. In contrast, the LI1 scenario mitigates the impact of a newly designed 
multiple-bank shock (not applied in the original AKM study45) when compared to the 
CI scenario, in which this treatment in fact yields the highest probability of whole-
system failure (Figure 16). While this illustrates that the LI1 scenario does not merely 
amplify the contagion dynamics irrespective of the initial distress, it also shows how 
an alternative assumption about information availability can flip the conclusion 
about which triggering event has the greater potential to cause harm to the system. 
In what follows we aim at exposing the main factors underlying the observed results.  
In the CI scenario, confidence is assessed over the extent of the whole 
system: while capturing the notion of a generalized psychological environment, this 
also has the effect of diluting the impact of a localized shock. In the LI1 scenario, by 
contrast, we have introduced the notion of “locally perceived” confidence that can 
vary with the neighborhood of different banks. The local impact of an initiating shock 
is therefore more intense than in a CI scenario but limited to the neighborhood, 
leaving the confidence of the remaining system initially intact. Yet, this local impact 
is subsequently transmitted through the system (analogous to the dynamics of crack 
propagation in a solid medium), resulting overall in a higher risk of system collapse 
than in the CI scenario. The similarity of the results of the LI2 and CI scenarios (Figure 
45
 The original study includes another type of shock called aggregated shock that also affects multiple banks but it 
was not designed as a comparison to a large-bank shock (for more details see Arinaminpathy et al., 2012). 
106 
16) provides a useful validity check, as the portion of the system taken into account
for the confidence estimation is minimally different between the two scenarios. 
The same reason applies to the results of the distributed shock treatment, 
which involves a failure of multiple small banks. While the impacts of the small-bank 
failures on confidence “add up” in the CI scenario, irrespective of their placement, in 
the LI1 scenario they independently harm confidences of the disparate localities in 
which they randomly fall. As a result the probability of whole-system failure after a 
distributed shock in LI1 is noticeably reduced when compared with the CI scenario 
(Figure 16). That the “adding-up effect” is less prominent in the LI1 scenario can also 
be seen if we contrast the results obtained from CI and LI1 after small idiosyncratic 
and multiple-bank treatments. For this purpose it is useful to interpret a multiple 
shock as adding extra instances of small shocks to a small shock. The resulting 
pattern is somewhat counterintuitive. While a small-bank shock alone leads to a 
higher probability of system failure in the LI1 scenario (than in the CI scenario), after 
multiple shocks the system fails with a higher probability in the CI scenario. 
To further analyze the difference in the results between the CI and LI1 
scenarios, we plotted standard deviations of confidence across the scenarios (Figure 
17). The standard deviations of the end-state confidence (the system is at rest) were 
calculated across 1,000 simulation replications, taking into account only the surviving 
population of banks. Two results stood out. First, standard deviations of confidence 
were consistently higher after the large concentrated shock than after the 
distributed shock. The immediate implication is that the outcome of a large 
concentrated shock is less predictable. Second, there was a large difference between 
the standard deviations of confidence in the CI and LI1 scenarios. To inspect if this 
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contributed to the difference in the corresponding results, we carried out an analysis 
of the role of the confidence variability.  
Figure 17. Standard deviations of confidence across all scenarios and three shock 
treatments: to a small bank, a large bank, and multiple banks. Local 1 and Local 2 = 
scenarios in which a bank has access only to information at distance 1 and 2, 
respectively. Noisy 5% and Noisy 30% = scenarios in which noise parameter 𝑣𝑣 is 5% 
and 30%, respectively. The delay scenarios are defined in Table 3. 
Test 1 – Variability of confidence 
We used the analysis to assess the sensitivity of global system indicators, the 
total assets 𝐴𝐴 and total interbank loans 𝐸𝐸, to manipulation of the variance of 
confidence 𝐶𝐶. A realization of 𝐶𝐶 in a simulation replication is in fact a vector 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡), 
which contains values of 𝐶𝐶 in different time steps. The manipulation first entailed 
construction of two vectors 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖CI  and 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖LI1  based on data from realizations of 𝐶𝐶 
in the CI and LI1 scenarios when a large-bank shock is applied. Two newly composed 
time sequences of 𝐶𝐶 values were generated from a normal distribution with the 
same mean and two variances: 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖CI~𝑁𝑁�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖AV,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖CI�, 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖LI1~𝑁𝑁�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖AV,𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖LI1�. The
mean 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
AV was estimated by averaging the confidence from the realization of the CI 
scenario over simulation repetitions. The first variance 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
CI was calculated from 
vectors of global confidence realized in the CI scenario and the second 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
LI1 from 
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vectors of local confidence realized in the LI1 scenario. Finally, the two vectors 
𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖CI  and 𝐶𝐶(𝑡𝑡)𝑖𝑖LI1  were exogenously applied to the CI setting of the simulation 
(Figure 18). The exogenous application of confidence implies that the calculation of 
confidence is decoupled from assets and interbank loans in the actual simulation and 
taken as given. The sequences of realized networks were controlled to be the same 
in both conditions by setting the same seeding of the random number generator in 
the simulation. 
Even when the timecourse of 𝐶𝐶 is being controlled for, as Figure 18 
illustrates, a higher drop of assets and interbank loans corresponds to a higher 
variance. Unlike in Figure 18a, in Figure 18b curves of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸 sink all the way down 
to 0. Given that assets and interbank loans determine the level of 𝐶𝐶 by definition 
(𝐶𝐶 = 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸), we designed an additional test to assess the impact of the timecourse of 𝐶𝐶 
on the results. 
a) C with variance derived from the CI scenario b) C with variance derived from the LI1 scenario 
Figure 18. The impact of exogenous manipulation of variance of 𝐶𝐶 on levels of assets and 
interbank loans across time steps. (a) 𝐶𝐶 with variance 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
CI (derived from the CI scenario). 
(b) 𝐶𝐶 with variance 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖
LI1 (derived from the LI1 scenario). CI is a scenario in which a bank 
has access to information from all other banks in the network. LI1 is a scenario in which a 
bank has access only to information from banks at distance 1. CI = complete information; 
LI = local information.
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Test 2 – Timecourse of confidence 
For this purpose the mean of individual confidences of all banks in the LI1 
scenario was calculated and denoted as local confidence. Confidence calculated 
according to the standard procedure, as in the CI scenario, was denoted global 
confidence. Figure 19 indicates a steeper decline of local as compared to global 
confidence when corresponding simulations were performed in an identical 
simulation setting, that is, when the identically placed large-bank shock was applied 
to an identical set of networks by controlling the seeding of the random number 
generator in the simulation.  
In the next step, we estimated the impact of the observed slope difference 
between the 𝐶𝐶 curves by exogenous application of the timecourse of local 
confidence to a hypothetical CI scenario together with the large-bank shock 
treatment. In the hypothetical scenario, as in the standard CI scenario, all banks in 
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Figure 19. Timecourse of global and local confidence. Global confidence is calculated in 
a standard way as in the CI scenario. Local confidence is an average of individual 
confidences of banks in LI1 scenario. CI is a scenario in which a bank has access to 
information from all other banks in the network. LI1 is a scenario in which a bank has 
access only to information from banks at distance 1. CI = complete information; LI = 
local information. 
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the system perceive confidence equally, but their perception is no longer 
endogenously determined. Instead, we forced their global confidence to be equal to 
previously determined local confidence taken from the realization of the LI1 scenario 
depicted in Figure 19. This procedure yielded a probability of over 90% of the whole system 
failing, a result similar to that from the LI1 scenario (Figure 20). The decline of confidence is 
therefore capable of explaining the difference in the results between the scenarios. 
In the NI scenarios, normally distributed noise averaged out across banks, 
producing no difference in results compared to the CI scenario (Figure 16). Assuming 
an alternative distribution of noise would potentially produce more interesting 
results. On the other hand, the DI scenarios indicate that the delay matters. The 
result can be accounted for as the effect of overconfidence. Namely, in the DI 
scenarios, confidence at a particular moment in time was higher than what actual 
information would imply. This narrows the time window for the preemptive action 
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Figure 20. A comparison between probability distributions of number of failed banks 
after a large-bank shock in the CI (a) and LI1 (b) scenarios when local confidence was 
exogenously applied to the CI scenario. CI is a scenario in which a bank has access to 
information from all other banks in the network. LI1 is a scenario in which a bank has 
access only to information from its direct neighbors at distance 1. CI = complete 
information; LI = local information. 
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that would enable shortening of long-term loans, which otherwise could not be used 
to meet the upcoming liquidity needs. 
Discussion 
 
This study demonstrates that the flow of information in a banking system is 
highly relevant for the dynamics of market behavior and resulting outcomes. In 
particular, we introduced uncertainty to a model of a banking network by 
manipulating accessibility and quality of information available to market 
participants. While it is clear that both the CI and LI1 scenarios are 
oversimplifications of reality, our exercise shows how departing from the CI 
assumption can have a striking impact on the results of the model. 
Our main insights are that after uncertainty is introduced, the system 
becomes far more vulnerable to large-bank failures, as well as that the impact of the 
large failures becomes less predictable. These findings are further strengthened by 
our newly design treatment, a multiple-bank shock, suggesting that unlike in the 
world of CI, in the uncertain world the major threat to the system is posed by the 
failure of a large bank. Additionally, as a large bank’s failure brings many smaller 
banks down, the multiple-shock treatment can help anticipate the dynamics of a 
possible second wave of crisis in the system. 
The overall results clearly indicate the need to recalculate the price of having 
large banks in the system and adjust regulation practices accordingly. Well-
diversified portfolios of large banks, which reduce the probability of individual 
failure, have granted them a privileged position with regulators. The resulting 
 112 
policies designed to ensure safety of individual banks, however, completely ignore 
systemic risk and the potential of large-bank failures to destabilize the entire system.  
The main technical contribution of this study is that we introduced simplified 
scenarios of alternative information spread in the banking system, relying on the 
structural properties of the underlying network of interactions. Our results 
demonstrate that information is a powerful agent of collective market behavior and 
indicate the need for a better understanding of the channels through which 
information flows in financial systems. In addition, we clarified events that are taking 
place in discrete simulation time by defining the time steps precisely. Besides 
heightened transparency of the underlying assumptions of the model, the clear 
sequence of events enabled monitoring of system indicators over time. For instance, 
our timecourse analysis of the confidence was based on this upgrade of the model. 
We also cast light on the procedure of network design by altering the AKM model 
slightly to make it more amenable to analysis and save computational time. 
Finally, our computational simulation represents an attempt to capture some of the 
complexity of banking networks even though many important aspects of reality are 
left out. With information traveling faster and further in the digital age, it can seem 
that uncertainty is slowly diminishing from the system. Yet, the increasing 
complexity of the markets that comes with globalization introduces another layer of 
uncertainty in the system, which might not be immediately obvious. Specifically, any 
sensible response to information from the market requires an understanding of its 
implications for other market participants, or even the system as a whole. As a 
result, the ecology of market behavior, in which decisions are to be made, is 
becoming increasingly interdependent and complex, making “rational decisions” 
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even harder to conceive. Capturing the complexity of such interactions requires 
looking at a sufficiently large portion of the system, which goes far beyond our 
analytical capabilities. We argue that computational models are a powerful tool that 
can bring fresh insights to the endeavor of understanding the contagion process in 
complex systems. Our study is a contribution along these lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Concentration and Systemic Risk in Banking Networks* 
 
Abstract. Since the 2007–2009 financial crisis, mounting evidence suggests that 
failures of large banks represent a major risk for the resilience of banking networks. 
This finding is widely used to link the increasing concentration of financial markets 
with an increase in their fragility. However, the same argument can easily result in 
the mistaken idea that any market change associated with an increase in 
concentration also amplifies systemic risk. In this study we applied stress tests to 
both hypothetical and empirically calibrated banking networks to observe how 
various bank-size distributions affect systemic risk. We found that analogous to the 
resilience of ecosystems, no single property of banking networks could explain the 
probability of systemic failure. We quantified concentration in terms of the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman index and also identified an additional indicator, inequality, 
measured by Rao’s quadratic entropy, which is important for understanding the 
concentration–resilience relationship. We found, counterintuitively, that an increase 
in concentration was beneficial when it was not followed by an increase in 
inequality. Similarly, a decrease in concentration became harmful when it was not 
followed by a decrease in inequality. Mergers of large banks increased, whereas 
mergers of small banks decreased systemic risk. Splitting of large banks was also 
effective in reducing systemic risk if splitting was not overdone to the extent that it 
resulted in too many small banks. Our results provide a guideline that can be applied 
to frequent issues that regulators face, such as bank mergers. 
 
 
                                                     
 
*
 I collaborated on a version of this chapter together with Mirta Galesic, Konstantinos Katsikopoulos, Amit 
Kothiyal.  
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Introduction 
Recent literature on the stability of financial systems links the growing concentration 
of financial networks with the increase in their fragility (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Gai et 
al., 2011; Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, & Alentorn, 2007). In particular, Nier et al. (2007) showed 
that when banks in a banking network become larger, a stress test results in the higher 
probability of systemic failures. Gai et al. (2011) supported findings from ecology and social 
networks that fat-tailed networks, although robust to random shocks, are particularly 
vulnerable to targeted shocks, namely, failures of key nodes. Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) 
reported that systemic risk associated with the failure of a bank does not scale with the 
bank’s size; that is, it increases faster than the size of failed banks. Put simply, when 
compared to small-bank failures, large-bank failures are more detrimental to the system 
than what the difference in size would indicate.  
The main implication of these studies can be summarized as follows: Because large-
bank failures are particularly devastating for the system, the increased presence of large 
banks is associated with the increased probability of widespread contagion. Extending this 
to the conclusion that the increased concentration implies increased fragility, we argue, is 
not substantiated by evidence and may lead to unsound policies. For instance, does the 
present evidence generate the confidence to design policies based on the assumption that a 
system always benefits when concentration is reduced?  
The global financial network is increasingly complex and there is no single measure 
that can capture its resilience. The experience of the 2007–2009 financial crisis has focused 
attention on the concentration of the financial network. In particular, large banks are 
recognized as perhaps the main culprit of the financial breakdown and significant carriers of 
 116 
systemic risk. However, the issue becomes less simple if one recognizes that large banks also 
have a higher capacity to absorb shocks. For instance, compare a large bank facing a 
financial shock to a few smaller interconnected banks that together have total assets equal 
to those of the large bank. If a regulation is applied that does not discriminate between 
banks based on size—say, the relative size of a required safety buffer is equal for large and 
small banks—then a shock that can be successfully absorbed by the large bank could be 
fatal for the system of small banks, because knocking out one of them can cause a chain 
reaction that can eventually bring the remaining banks down. The result, however, depends 
on many factors, such as the way the small banks are connected and the placement of the 
shock. This is why computational simulations are a valuable tool for exploring some of those 
influential factors. The bottom line is that the connection between the size distribution of 
banks in the network and the network’s resilience is not straightforward.  
To deal with the problem, we identified two components of systemic risk that are 
relevant to understanding the concentration–resilience relationship: the a priori risk that 
major idiosyncratic failures (financial shocks) occur in the system, and the a posteriori risk 
that the system will fail as a result of the financial shock. We also precisely defined 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which allowed us to 
manipulate and monitor its levels. We could then demonstrate that an increase in 
concentration can be beneficial for the system’s resilience. In line with our complexity 
perspective—that it is unlikely that one indicator is capable of explaining the system’s 
resilience—we identified additional indicators.  For this purpose we consulted the ecological 
literature with its long tradition of studying connections between ecological diversity and 
resilience (Costanza & Kemp, 1994; Costanza, Wainger, et al., 1993). One of these indicators 
that is particularly important for our study is an indicator of inequality, measured by Rao’s 
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quadratic entropy. In economics, inequality is often confounded with concentration because 
most of the time they go hand in hand. Yet this is not always the case; for instance, merging 
two small banks can, depending on the size distribution of the remaining banks in the 
network, increase the concentration and reduce the inequality of the system at the same 
time. With the example of a network in which the bank-size distribution is calibrated with 
empirical data, we showed that when inequality did not follow concentration, an increase in 
concentration was beneficial for the system’s resilience.  
In what follows we discuss the decomposition of systemic risk, outline the limitations 
of previous studies that addressed the concentration–resilience relationship, and present 
our framework designed to overcome the previous methodological deficiencies. We report 
our series of computational experiments and finally offer clear policy recommendations 
based on our results. We conclude with a discussion. 
Systemic Risk 
Systemic risk is the risk that a major fraction of a financial system ceases to function 
as a credit provider and collapses (Poledna, Molina-Borboa, Martínez-Jaramillo, van der Leij, 
& Thurner, 2015; Poledna & Thurner, 2014). In our study we quantified systemic risk in 
terms of the probability that the whole system would collapse. We also distinguished 
between two components of systemic risk that can be affected by the distribution of bank 
sizes in the system: (a) the system’s disposition to generate idiosyncratic shocks capable of 
disturbing the whole system and (b) the system’s capacity to absorb shocks. The first relates 
to the a priori probability that a large disturbance, typically a large bank failure, will occur 
within the system, and the second to the a posteriori probability that the system will fail as 
a result of this shock. 
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The current understanding of the a priori probability does not go much beyond the 
simple rationale that the more large banks there are in the system, the higher probability 
that one will fail for an idiosyncratic reason. Previous studies that relied on a stress test as a 
tool for testing the systemic stability typically assumed that the initial disturbance in the 
system was sparked by an idiosyncratic bank failure (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Nier et al., 
2007). If the task is to compare the resilience of systems with different bank-size 
distributions, a lack of understanding of how the likelihood of an idiosyncratic failure relates 
to bank size becomes a serious obstacle. Another hindrance is that in practice, this 
relationship is often blurred by government interventions, particularly those inspired by the 
policy “too big to fail.” For this reason, the application of random shocks can be used only 
for rough estimates, as it implies an equal probability of idiosyncratic failures across 
different bank sizes.  
Another important aspect of the problem is that manipulating the size distribution of 
banks can also affect the a posteriori probability that the system will fail when confronted 
with a shock. Yet in the design of previous studies (Arinaminpathy et al., 2012; Gai et al., 
2011; Nier et al., 2007), the two components of systemic risk were confounded. Therefore, 
in this study we created a framework in which to examine this particular question, namely, 
how a change in the bank-size distribution affects the a posteriori probability of systemic 
failures. The corresponding property quantified by the a posteriori probability we call the 
absorbance capacity of the system. A system with higher absorbance capacity has a smaller 
risk of systemic failure for a given size of shock. In what follows, we list the main deficiencies 
of the previous studies in dealing with this question and describe how we designed our 
framework to avoid these problems. 
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Limitations of Previous Methodology 
Banking networks are often reported as becoming increasingly concentrated; but it is 
rare that concentration is defined in terms of a comprehensive measure of the distribution 
of bank sizes. Instead, it is quantified through the fraction of total assets held by large 
banks, or the pace of growth of the biggest banks in the system (Gai et al., 2011). Although 
these are reliable indicators of increased concentration, it is difficult to use them to study 
how fine-grained changes in concentration affect a system’s resilience. In previous work the 
manipulation of concentration was typically simplified. To produce systems that were more 
concentrated, Nier et al. (2007) enlarged the sizes of the banks proportionally. 
Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) achieved the same result by varying the ratio of size disparity 
between the small and large banks in the system. Gai et al. (2011) made a distinction 
between a random network generated from a Poisson distribution and a fat-tailed network 
generated from a geometric distribution, which Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) also considered. 
Given that the present-day banking network has a fat-tailed distribution of bank sizes, policy 
makers must rely on a finer understanding of the relationship between the size distribution 
and the system’s resilience. Furthermore, in each of the mentioned studies, the 
manipulation of concentration entailed a change in the size of the shock applied to the 
system, and in Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) the level of total assets in the system changed as 
a function of concentration; both can hinder a controlled comparison of systems with 
different size distributions. Finally, given that the level of concentration does not define the 
size distribution of a network completely—more than one network can have the same 
concentration—it is also not clear what other relevant indicators might affect a system’s 
resilience. 
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The Model 
To test the resilience of banking systems, we observed the performance of systems 
with various size distributions that have been exposed to a large shock. Our measurement 
of performance is absorbance capacity, quantified as the probability that the whole system 
will collapse: the lower the probability of systemic failure, the higher the capacity of a 
system to absorb shocks. Our model of the banking system is a modified version of 
Arinaminpaty, Kapadia, and May’s (2012) model (hereafter, the AKM model).  
The AKM model is an agent-based simulation of interbank markets in which agents 
are banks that borrow and lend money to each other. The banking system is represented as 
a network whose nodes (vertexes) are banks, and edges (links) are their borrowing and 
lending relationships. Our modeling of 
banks, their relationships, and their 
behavior corresponds precisely to the 
AKM model. After presenting the features 
of the AKM model we adopted in our 
model, we introduce the changes we 
made in the constraints at the system 
level and describe the administration of 
the stress test as well as the network 
structure. 
 Modeling of banks. Banks are represented as simplified balance sheets (Figure 21). 
The liability side contains capital, retail deposits, and interbank borrowing. The capital level 
measures how much stress on the asset side a bank can withstand before suffering from a 
capital default and becoming insolvent (this is discussed separately in the section on 
Figure 21. A balance sheet representation of 
a bank (adapted from Arinaminpathy et al., 
2012). 𝑎𝑎T = total assets; γ = capital ratio; 𝑙𝑙 = 
liquidity ratio; θ = interbank loans-to-assets 
ratio; 𝑧𝑧 = average number of incoming and 
outgoing loans. 
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modeling of bank failures). Retail deposits are taken to be external to the system and do not 
play any active role in the model. Interbank borrowing represents the amount of incoming 
loans from other banks and their number represents the in-degree of an individual node. On 
the asset side there are 𝑛𝑛 external asset classes, liquid assets, and interbank lending. 
External asset classes are distributed among banks from a fixed number 𝐺𝐺 of distinct asset 
classes contained in the system. Liquid assets are a small fraction 𝑙𝑙 of overall assets that 
banks keep in the most liquid form to meet immediate needs; they are mostly composed of 
cash or any cash equivalent, such as central bank reserves or high-quality government 
bonds, which are easily convertible to money. Finally, interbank lending corresponds to 
outgoing loans to other banks in the system and their number is the out-degree of a node. A 
random half of interbank lending is assigned to be short-term and the rest is long-term 
lending. 
Modeling bank behavior. Two main determinants of a bank’s behavior are its 
confidence in the system 𝐶𝐶 and its individual health ℎ. In the AKM model confidence is 
calculated as a function of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐸𝐸, which are measures of solvency and liquidity of the 
system, respectively:   
𝐶𝐶 = 𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸; 
𝐴𝐴 = �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
;      𝐸𝐸 = �𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
; 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎T𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑎𝑎T𝑖𝑖0𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ;        𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖0𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 . 
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At a given point in time, 𝐴𝐴 denotes the total value of all remaining assets in the system as a 
proportion of its initial value; 𝐸𝐸 is similarly the fraction of interbank loans not withdrawn 
from the system; 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖  and 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 are the remaining assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖 as the 
proportion of the initial value of total assets in the system; 𝑎𝑎T𝑖𝑖 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are the absolute 
values of remaining assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖; and 𝑎𝑎T𝑖𝑖
0 and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
0 are the initial 
absolute values of assets and interbank loans of bank 𝑖𝑖. 
Unlike 𝐶𝐶, which is a systemic parameter, ℎ𝑖𝑖  denotes the individual health of bank 𝑖𝑖 
and is calculated as a function of its indicators of solvency 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 and liquidity 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖;       0 < ℎ𝑖𝑖 < 1; 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = min�1, �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖ST + 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖� 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ST� �, 
 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the capital of bank 𝑖𝑖 as a proportion of its initial value, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the fraction of 𝑖𝑖’s 
short-term liabilities that the bank can settle immediately through its liquid and short-term 
assets, 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
ST is the total value of 𝑖𝑖’s short-term interbank assets, 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖
ST is the total value of 𝑖𝑖’s 
short-term interbank liabilities, and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 is the proportion of liquid assets held by bank 𝑖𝑖. 
There are two possible actions that banks can take in the discrete simulation time: 
shorten long-term interbank loans, and withdraw short interbank loans. Only short-term 
loans can be withdrawn in a single time step; shortening of long-term loans takes an 
additional time step. The actions are fully determined by two decision rules: 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑗𝑗 < (1 − 𝐶𝐶);                                  (1) 
ℎ𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑗𝑗 < (1 − 𝐶𝐶)2.                                 (2) 
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The shortening action is taken whenever Condition 1 is satisfied, and the withdrawing action 
is taken whenever Condition 2 is satisfied. There is simple logic behind the rules: If 𝐶𝐶 is high 
(1 or close to 1) it is less likely that conditions will be satisfied. In contrast, a drop in 𝐶𝐶 can 
cause liquidity hoarding, as this affects the decision conditions of all banks. In addition, the 
shortening condition is easier to satisfy than the withdrawing condition, which means that 
banks resort to withdrawal only in more urgent situations. 
The decision rules and the role of confidence in the system reveal the simplicity of 
the model mechanism. Bank failures lead to a decrease of assets and loans in the system, 
and the lower the level of assets and loans in the system, the lower the confidence of the 
banks. A decrease in confidence leads to banks making more conservative decisions that can 
manifest as shortening of lending maturities or cutting out lending altogether. This, in turn, 
can perpetuate the tenuous condition of the system, causing bank failures and further 
dropping of confidence. 
System constraints and a stress test. This is where our modifications come into play. 
Instead of constraining the number of banks in the system, we constrained the size of the 
system in terms of total assets 𝑎𝑎T. The size of the shock 𝑆𝑆 applied to the system was also 
kept constant and determined as a portion of total assets 𝑆𝑆 = 𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑎𝑎T. The assets allocated 
for the purpose of shock application 𝑆𝑆 were used to form a bank and the remaining assets 
𝑎𝑎R = 𝑎𝑎T − 𝑆𝑆 to form the rest of the network. We administered the shock by forcing the 
assigned bank to fail. The rest of total assets 𝑎𝑎R are distributed among banks within a range 
of sizes from the smallest bank with out-degree 𝑑𝑑out to the biggest bank with out-degree 
𝑞𝑞 ∗ 𝑑𝑑out. The size discrepancy indicator 𝑞𝑞 measures how many times the biggest bank is 
larger than the smallest one; all possible sizes of banks have to fall in between the two. 
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Modeling of network structure. The network is a directed graph in which each edge 
is an interbank loan directed from lender to borrower (for convenience, the value of each 
loan is taken to be 1). To generate the distribution of bank sizes from the assets 𝑎𝑎R within 
the size range set by parameter 𝑞𝑞, instead of the Poisson distribution used in the AKM 
model, we used the beta probability density function (PDF) with parameters α and β. Since 
the proportion of interbank loans 𝜃𝜃 in the total assets of each bank is fixed, the distribution 
of out-degrees practically determines the distribution of bank sizes in the system. To 
determine in-degrees we used the degree distribution of out-degree draws as weights to 
conduct weighted random sampling of corresponding in-degrees. The banks can also be 
interrelated if they share the same external asset classes. Those relationships are not 
represented as edges in the network but they serve as a means of asset price contagion. 
The modifications of the AKM model were necessary for our study. It was important 
to prevent interplay between our manipulation of the size distribution and the level of total 
assets in the system. All else being equal, increasing the amount of assets in the system 
increases its ability to absorb shocks of a given size. This is why it is necessary to keep the 
amount of total assets constant. For the same reason, the size of the initial shock applied to 
the system must also be kept unchanged. As a result, we administered targeted shocks 
instead of random shocks. The use of a beta distribution function is justified by its flexibility, 
which enables easy manipulation of the bank-size distribution, which is essential for the 
purpose of our study. Finally, the size of the initial shock was calibrated to result in positive 
values for the probability that the whole system would collapse. Therefore, the initial shock 
could be relatively large. One might ask if it is reasonable to apply large shocks to a low-
concentration system, which does not contain large banks to begin with. In this context, it is 
useful to think about the initial shock as an experimental device that can take hypothetical 
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values that help us perform the test. In addition, shocks in real-world banking systems do 
not have to arise from within the system. A low-concentration system can be affected by 
large shocks if it, for instance, is connected with external financial markets whose 
breakdown can transmit financial contagion over its borders; large shocks can also come 
from outside the financial system.  
Indicators of Size Distribution 
There is no single indicator that can fully describe the properties of the distribution 
of bank sizes. Therefore, we used multiple indicators that are typically used to quantify 
concentration, heterogeneity, and inequality in economic, social, or ecological systems. 
These concepts are clearly interrelated, as are their corresponding indicators. However, our 
idea was to observe if any one or a combination of indicators can help explain the 
accompanying change in absorbance capacity of the system. 
The economics literature offers a variety of indicators for measuring concentration in 
the market. Many of these are based on an arbitrary percentage (or number) of the largest 
market participants while ignoring the rest of the market. The concentration indicator that 
is, perhaps, the most widely used in the economics literature and practice and is at the same 
time based on the entire size distribution of market participants is the Herfindahl–
Hirschman index (HHI): 
 
HHI = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁
𝑏𝑏=𝑖𝑖
, 
 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the market share of a bank (firm) 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑁𝑁 is the number of banks in the system. 
The market share of a bank is the proportion of its interbank loans (out-degree) out of all 
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interbank loans in the system. The index ranges from 1 𝑁𝑁⁄  to 1, and the higher it is, the 
higher the concentration of the system.  
In ecology, on the other hand, there is wide use of indicators that describe the 
variety of species in an ecosystem. This property is commonly called ecological diversity or 
heterogeneity. If the number of species in an ecosystem is given, then heterogeneity is 
determined by two factors: their relative availability, and interspecies differences (Twu, 
Mostofi, & Egerstedt, 2014). The difficulty of measuring the distance between species is the 
main reason why ecological heterogeneity typically neglects the second factor. An example 
is the Simpson diversity index (which is equivalent to the HHI) in which the relative 
availability of species corresponds to the market shares of individual firms. The similarity is 
intuitive—if markets are dominated by a few market participants then the system is not 
likely to be very heterogeneous. The Shannon entropy is another widely used heterogeneity 
indicator also calculated solely from the relative availability of species. In network science, 
this indicator is commonly denoted the entropy of degree distribution (EDD):  
 
EDD = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖ln 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖
. 
 
The interpretation of the indicator can be put this way: The more even the participation of 
available species in a population, the higher the heterogeneity. Another indicator, Rao’s 
quadratic entropy (RQE), additionally takes into account the second factor of 
heterogeneity—the distance among the species in the population:  
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RQE = ��𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗)2,𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖
 
where 𝑑𝑑(𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗), in our case, is the size difference between banks 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The RQE specifies 
that the higher the availability of more distant species, the higher the quadratic entropy. 
The quadratic entropy adds a novel piece of information to the partial measures of 
heterogeneity and it is useful to think of it as an indicator of inequality in the system.  
Compositional diversity combines partial indicators (Ricotta & Marignani, 2007). 
Here, we consider only separate indicators, as combining the indicators makes 
interpretation difficult. 
We also calculate normalized I′ versions of the indicators I with the standard 
procedure: 
I′ = I − IminImax − Imin, 
where I stands for any of the above indicators; Imax and Imin are maximal and minimal 
values of corresponding indicators that can be obtained given constraints imposed by other 
system parameters—for instance, HHImin and HHImax are calculated from size distributions 
that are entirely composed of banks with the minimal and maximal out-degree, respectively. 
Simulation Experiments 
In what follows we present a series of simulation experiments. Each experiment was 
based on 1,000 simulation replications and the indicators were calculated as averages 
across the replications. The first two experiments considered several hypothetical size 
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distributions. We then constructed a network with a size distribution calibrated with 
empirical data and conducted further tests to check if our previous observations could be 
extended to real-world banking networks.  
Experiment 1: The skewness of the bank-size distribution 
In the first experiment we contrasted the absorbance capacity of two extreme size 
distributions: one skewed positively, which significantly favors the availability of small 
banks, and the other skewed negatively, which favors the availability of large banks. The 
magnitude of skewness is equal in both cases. The uniform distribution is included as a 
reference point. To simulate the scenarios we used the beta PDF depicted in Figure 22. The 
bank sizes drawn from the beta distribution, which take values from 0 to 1, could be 
interpreted as normalized bank sizes. To derive the banks’ degree distributions, values 
obtained from the beta distribution were mapped to a range of available bank sizes 
determined by the minimal and maximal out-degree of a bank in the system (the default 
value of the minimal out-degree is 5, and the maximal out-degree is 𝑞𝑞 ∗ 5). 
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The results of the simulation (Table 4) show that a distribution that favors the 
availability of large banks (negatively skewed) and is associated with a higher HHI′ is also 
associated with a lower risk of systematic failure. The stable level of RQE′ for the two 
skewed distributions indicates that the degree of inequality is not sensitive to the sign of 
skewness provided the magnitude of the skewness is equal. As for EDD′, there is no clear 
linear relationship between the indicator and the absorbance capacity of the system.  
Table 4. Manipulation of the skewness of the size distribution 
Size distribution 
System indicator HHI EDD RQE HHI′ EDD′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
Positively skewed 0.02 3.26 353.67 0.53 0.85 0.36 0.93 
Uniform 0.02 3.34 332.02 0.63 0.87 0.34 0.45 
Negatively skewed 0.03 3.05 355.71 0.77 0.80 0.36 0.16 
Note. HHI = Herfindahl–Hirschman index; EDD = entropy of degree distribution; RQE = 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; HHI′, EDD′, RQE′ = normalized indicators HHI, EDD, RQE; 𝑃𝑃f = 
probability of systemic failure. 
Figure 22. The beta probability density function with parameters 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏. The parameters 
are set so that the distribution takes three shapes: Negatively skewed (blue; 𝑎𝑎 = 1 and 
𝑏𝑏 = 0.5), uniform (black dashed; 𝑎𝑎 = 1 and 𝑏𝑏 = 1), and positively skewed (red; 𝑎𝑎 = 0.5 and 
𝑏𝑏 = 1). Note: The values on the 𝑥𝑥 axis can be interpreted as normalized bank sizes. These 
values are mapped to the preset range of available bank sizes in the system to obtain the 
banks’ degree distributions.   
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Experiment 2: The disparity between bank sizes 
In the second experiment we manipulated the size distribution without explicitly 
favoring either small or large banks. For this purpose we compared three symmetric 
distributions: U-shaped, uniform, and bell-shaped (Figure 23).  
In contrast to the results from Experiment 1, here the distributions associated with a 
higher HHI′ correspond to a higher risk of systemic failure (Table 5). Another important 
difference is that unlike in the first experiment, the increase in HHI′ was accompanied by an 
even more rapid increase in RQE′. 
Figure 23. The beta probability density function with parameters 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏. The 
parameters are set so that three distributions are obtained: U-shaped (blue; 𝑎𝑎 = 0.1 
and 𝑏𝑏 = 0.1), uniform (black dashed; 𝑎𝑎 = 1 and 𝑏𝑏 = 1), and bell-shaped (red; 𝑎𝑎 = 10 
and 𝑏𝑏 = 10). Note: The values on the 𝑥𝑥 axis can be interpreted as normalized bank sizes. 
These values are mapped to the preset range of available bank sizes in the system to 
obtain the banks’ degree distributions.   
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Table 5. The manipulation of the disparity between the bank’s size 
Size distribution 
System indicator HHI EDD RQE HHI′ EDD′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
U-shaped 0.03 2.01 815.35 0.83 0.52 0.83 0.80 
Uniform 0.02 3.34 332.02 0.63 0.87 0.34 0.45 
Bell-shaped 0.02 2.77 51.84 0.52 0.72 0.05 0.21 
Note. HHI = Herfindahl–Hirschman index; EDD = entropy of degree distribution; RQE = 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; HHI′, EDD′, RQE′ = normalized indicators HHI, EDD, RQE; 𝑃𝑃f = 
probability of systemic failure. 
 
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that the increase in concentration can 
be beneficial for the system by increasing its absorbance capacity. In contrast, when the 
increase in concentration was followed by a sharp increase in inequality, the result was the 
opposite—a drop in the absorbance capacity. This indicates a potentially interesting 
interplay between HHI′ and RQE′ in the absorbance capacity. On the other hand, our tests 
did not reveal a direct correspondence between EDD′ and system performance. Therefore, 
our further analysis was mostly devoted to the analysis of HHI′ and RQE′. We next 
constructed a bank-size distribution calibrated with empirical data to see if the observations 
from hypothetical distributions have similar implications in a real-world setting. To do so we 
approximated an empirically parametrized Pareto distribution with a beta distribution, since 
a beta distribution was more convenient for the manipulation of the indicators required for 
further analysis.  
Approximation of a Pareto Distribution with a Beta Distribution 
Arinaminpaty et al. (2012) reported that a Pareto distribution, 
 
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = 1 − (𝑥𝑥0 𝑥𝑥)⁄ α, 
 132 
 
defined for 𝑥𝑥 > 𝑥𝑥0 and 𝑥𝑥0 > 0, with the scale parameter α = 0.83, is the closest fit to the 
data for the U.S. banking sector in 2011 obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Since the unbounded Pareto distribution can generate unrealistically large size 
discrepancies, we used a truncated version of a Pareto distribution with a cumulative 
distribution function: 
 
𝐹𝐹T(𝑥𝑥) = 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼𝑥𝑥−α1 − (𝑙𝑙 ℎ)⁄ α, 
 
where 𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ ℎ, and α > 0; the upper bound is set to ℎ = 2,000 and the lower bound is 
equal to the minimal bank degree 𝑙𝑙 = 5; the value of these two parameters practically imply 
that the parameter of size discrepancy takes the value 𝑞𝑞 = 400. 
To approximate 𝑋𝑋~𝐹𝐹T(𝑥𝑥) with 𝑌𝑌~Beta(𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏) we applied the method of moments. 
This method requires equating the first and the second moment of the two distributions. 
Mean and variance of the truncated Pareto distribution are given by 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋) = 𝑙𝑙α1 − (𝑙𝑙 ℎ)⁄ α αα − 1 � 1𝑙𝑙α−1 − 1ℎα−1�, 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) = 𝑙𝑙α1 − (𝑙𝑙 ℎ)⁄ α αα − 2 � 1𝑙𝑙α−2 − 1ℎα−2�, 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋2) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋)2. 
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For the given values of parameters 𝑙𝑙, ℎ, and α, the corresponding values of mean and 
variance are 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋) = 43.49, and 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋) = 17,872.30. Given that the beta distribution 
takes values in the range of 0 to 1, we normalized 𝑋𝑋 using the standard method: 
 
𝑋𝑋′ = 𝑋𝑋 − 𝑙𝑙
ℎ − 𝑙𝑙
. 
 
The corresponding mean and variance of 𝑋𝑋′ are 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑙𝑙
ℎ − 𝑙𝑙
, 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′) = 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋)(ℎ − 𝑙𝑙)2. 
 
The obtained normalized values are 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′) = 0.0193, and 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′) = 0.0045. As for the 
beta function, the corresponding moments are 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 , 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏)2(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 + 1). 
 
Now, we can equate the moments: 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋) − 𝑙𝑙
ℎ − 𝑙𝑙
= 𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏, 
 
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋)(ℎ − 𝑙𝑙)2 = 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏)2(𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏 + 1). 
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Solving the equations for 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 results in 
 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)2
𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′) �1 − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)� − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′), 
 
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′)
𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′) ��1 − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)�𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′) − 1� ��1 − 𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)�𝐸𝐸(𝑋𝑋′)𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎𝑉𝑉(𝑋𝑋′) �. 
 
Assigning the above values to the parameters in the equations gives 𝑎𝑎0 = 0.062, and 
𝑏𝑏0 = 3.151. Figure 24 displays the truncated Pareto PDF and its beta approximation. 
 
 
Manipulation of Beta Parameters 
In this section we describe our exploration of system behavior in the vicinity of the 
approximated beta PDF when we performed a fine manipulation of 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 around the 
determined parameter values 𝑎𝑎0 = 0.062 and 𝑏𝑏0 = 3.151. The goal was to observe how the 
manipulation of the beta PDF in the domain of realistic size distributions affects the 
Figure 24. The truncated Pareto probability density function (PDF) with the scale 
parameter α = 0.83 and its approximation with the beta PDF with parameters 
𝑎𝑎 = 0.062 and 𝑏𝑏 = 3.151. 
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distribution indicators and the corresponding absorbance capacity. In Experiments 3 and 4, 
we manipulated each of the parameters 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 independently, that is, during the 
manipulations one of the parameters remained constant.  
Experiment 3: Manipulation of parameter 𝒃𝒃 
The manipulation of parameter 𝑏𝑏 in the vicinity of 𝑏𝑏0 led to a change mainly in the 
“tail” part of the beta PDF (Figure 25). In particular, when 𝑏𝑏 went down, the amount of 
assets contained in the tail inflated—roughly speaking, the size or the number of large banks 
became bigger on average. As a result there was an increase in HHI′ and RQE′. The opposite 
was true when 𝑏𝑏 went up.  
 
 
      
  
Figure 25. The collection of the beta probability density functions when 𝑏𝑏 takes 
values in the range bounded by the condition 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏0 ∗ (−0.8) ≤ 𝑏𝑏 ≤ 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏0 ∗0.8. 𝑏𝑏0 = 3.151; 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎0. 
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Table 6. The manipulation of beta parameter 𝑏𝑏 in the vicinity of 𝑏𝑏0 
Relative change of 𝑏𝑏 
System indicator 
HHI′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
−80% 0.55 0.23 0.47 
−40% 0.31 0.06 0.49 
−20% 0.26 0.04 0.49 0% (𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏0) 0.22 0.03 0.53 20% 0.19 0.02 0.56 40% 0.16 0.02 0.57 80% 0.13 0.01 0.61 
Note. HHI′ = Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index; RQE′ = normalized 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; 𝑃𝑃f = probability of systemic failure; 𝑏𝑏0 = 3.151; 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎0 
. 
Experiment 4: Manipulation of parameter 𝒂𝒂 
In contrast to the manipulation of 𝑏𝑏, which served for exploring the change in the tail 
part of the size distribution, the manipulation of 𝑎𝑎 largely affected its opposite end (Figure 
26). When 𝑎𝑎 increased, the change involved assets held by small banks, so that a number of 
them migrated toward the center of the size distribution. This led to a moderate increase in 
HHI′ while RQE′ remained at essentially the same level (Table 7). 
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Table 7. The manipulation of beta parameter 𝑎𝑎 in the vicinity of 𝑎𝑎0 Relative change of 𝑎𝑎 System indicator 
HHI′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
-80% 0.13 0.01 0.98 
-40% 0.20 0.02 0.80 
-20% 0.20 0.02 0.61 
0% (𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎0) 0.22 0.03 0.53 
20% 0.23 0.03 0.40 
40% 0.23 0.03 0.33 
80% 0.24 0.04 0.23 
Note. HHI′ = Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index; RQE′ = normalized 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; 𝑃𝑃f = probability of systemic failure; 𝑎𝑎0 = 0.062; 
𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏0. 
 
The bottom line of both experiments is that an abrupt increase in 
concentration and inequality produced a small positive effect on the system, 
whereas a moderate increase in concentration accompanied with a fairly steady 
level of inequality yielded large benefits for systemic stability. To test if these 
observations hold in the case of realistic changes in the market, such as bank 
Figure 26. The collection of the beta probability density functions 
when 𝑎𝑎 takes values in the range bounded by the condition 
𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎0 ∗ (−0.8) ≤ 𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑎0 ∗ 0.8. 𝑎𝑎0 = 0.062; 𝑏𝑏 = 𝑏𝑏0. 
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mergers or splits, we conducted two more experiments. The additional value of 
these tests is that they can provide guidance on how regulators should act in such 
situations. 
Experiment 5: Bank mergers 
Bank mergers are one of the main causes of the growing concentration in the 
banking sector (K. D. Jones & Nguyen, 2005). Here, we present a few simple 
scenarios and their impact on the system indicators (Table 8).  
                  
Table 8. The impact of bank mergers on the system indicators 
Merger includes 
System indicator 
HHI′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
3 largest banks 0.49 0.07 0.94 
2 largest banks 0.36 0.05 0.83 
0 banks (no merger) 0.22 0.03 0.53 
5 smallest banks 0.23 0.03 0.13 
10 smallest banks 0.23 0.03 0.11 
Note. HHI′ = Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index; RQE′ = normalized 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; 𝑃𝑃f = probability of systemic failure. 
 
When the largest banks in the system merged, this led as expected to a 
considerable increase in concentration and inequality and had an equally negative 
impact on systemic risk (Table 8). In contrast, the small-bank mergers resulted in a 
minor increase in concentration and a steady level of inequality, leading to a major 
reduction in systemic risk. 
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Experiment 6: Bank splits 
Bank splits are not as common as mergers. Here, we provide a few simple 
scenarios of bank splits as a contrast to the scenarios in Experiment 5 (Table 9). The 
banks resulting from the splits are assumed to be equal in size. 
 
Table 9. The impact of bank splits on the system indicators 
The largest bank splits into 
System indicator 
HHI′ RQE′ 𝑃𝑃f 
1 bank (no split) 0.22 0.03 0.53 
2 banks 0.15 0.02 0.28 
3 banks 0.12 0.01 0.21 
10 banks 0.08 0.01 0.16 
25 banks 0.07 0.00 0.18 
50 banks 0.07 0.00 0.41 
75 banks 0.07 0.00 0.71 
The smallest banks 0.07 0.00 0.98 
Note. HHI′ = Normalized Herfindahl–Hirschman index; RQE′ = normalized 
Rao’s quadratic entropy; 𝑃𝑃f = probability of systemic failure. 
 
The results show that splitting the largest bank was beneficial as long as it 
was associated with a decrease in concentration and inequality (Table 9). When the 
decrease in concentration stagnated, the positive effects turned negative. 
The result from Experiments 5 and 6 confirmed our previous observations 
that neither concentration nor inequality can be used as a single indicator of 
systemic risk. For instance, mergers that clearly always lead to an increase in 
concentration can be beneficial or detrimental to resilience depending on the size of 
the banks involved in a particular merger. We also observed that the analogous 
rationale applies to the case of bank splits. In general, whenever a change in the 
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system led to the migration of assets toward the center of the size distribution, this 
had positive effects on the absorbance capacity of the system. We observed the 
same pattern in Experiment 2, in which the bell-shaped distribution “outperformed” 
the uniform and the U-shaped distribution. Separate tests that are not reported here 
extended this by showing that the smaller the variance of the bell-shaped 
distribution, the higher the absorbance capacity of the system. Furthermore, the 
system is more sensitive to changes in the part of the size distribution with smaller 
banks. This was first indicated in Experiment 4, in which systemic resilience turned 
out to be very sensitive to the changes in the small-bank area, and was later 
confirmed in Experiments 5 and 6, where merging relatively few small banks was 
very effective in reducing systemic risk, and splitting became progressively harmful 
when the largest bank was divided into relatively very small banks. 
Discussion 
Banking networks, like ecological networks, are complex, and there is no 
single indicator that can explain their resilience. In this study we debunked a 
simplified view of the relationship between concentration and resilience. We 
summarize our main findings as follows: Given the current state of banking 
networks, a decrease in concentration will not always lead to an increase in stability; 
an increase in concentration turned out to be beneficial when it was not followed by 
an increase in inequality; analogously, a decrease in concentration became harmful 
when it was not followed by a decrease in inequality; mergers of large banks are 
detrimental, whereas mergers of small banks are beneficial for systemic resilience; 
splitting of large banks is also effective in reducing systemic risk if splitting is not 
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overdone to the extent that it results in too many small banks. Our results provide a 
useful guideline for policy makers that can help in dealing with frequent market 
changes such as mergers.  
The main caveat is that our study does not address how the bank-size 
distribution affects the a priori probability that triggering events will occur in the 
system. However, in this respect our findings, such as those related to mergers of 
large banks, are not in conflict with previous studies that have identified large banks 
as major carriers of systemic risk—because if they fail, the entire system may suffer. 
Here, we demonstrated that an increased concentration in the part of the size 
distribution taken up by small banks could, in fact, be beneficial for systemic 
stability. Further, the decomposition of systemic risk can lead to a better 
understanding of its individual components before they are reintegrated. 
There is no reason to doubt that the challenge of arriving at a better 
understanding of financial networks is similar to that faced by ecologists who had to 
explore a variety of indicators in order to advance the understanding of the 
resilience of ecological systems. Our contribution along these lines is that we have 
shown that an additional indicator, inequality, can help elucidate how the size 
distribution in a banking system affects its systemic risk. Therefore, it would not be 
surprising if further progress is made by including additional indicators. 
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